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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is a study to determine the role and responsibility of the minor
stakeholders in the elimination of substandard shipping and its impact on their
pursuit for profitability in a very dynamic shipping industry.
The shipping industry is examined to determine the origin and nature of substandard
shipping, within the context of maritime safety and environmental protection, and the
environment that fosters its continued existence. The efforts of governments through
a regulatory regime and various international identities (major stakeholders), to deter
and where necessary apprehend substandard shipping is analysed. The need for the
support of the market players (minor stakeholders), in the overall process of
eliminating substandard shipping is established.
The economic pursuit of the minor stakeholders, along with their obligations and
response to safety and environmental regulations being integrated in the shipping
market dynamics, are all examined. The relatively dormant notion of self-regulation
of the shipping industry is explored, with the objective of giving it greater
prominence. The concept of quality shipping and its antecedents of transparency and
safety culture, as well as an appropriate regulatory regime that would enhance the
concept, are also examined. Finally, the propeller principle is conceptualized as a
representation of the cooperating, coordination, and dynamics involved in pursuing
the goal of quality shipping.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Shipping is a truly international industry, which today forms an integral part of the
domestic and international economic landscape.

Without effective and efficient

means of moving both bulk and parcel goods by sea, international trade would grind
to a halt and nations the world over would suffer the repercussion of stagnant
economies, leading to chaos, starvation, and possible anarchy. Globalisation has had
the effect of further propelling shipping to even greater prominence, that of a catalyst
for world peace and prosperity. The reality, however, is that ships operate in a very
fragile marine environment with an inherent perilous nature, which creates social
cost detractors of safety and environmental protection.
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) tasked with the responsibility of
minimising the social cost of shipping, has established a clear mandate to strive for
cleaner oceans and safer ships. Consequently, there is a plethora of international
conventions that set standards for safety of life and property, and the protection of
the marine environment from pollution. Ships that operate outside these standards
are deemed to be sub-standard, and therefore pose the greatest risks.
Flag state, port state, and coastal states have the most at stake in the event of a
maritime catastrophe, therefore, along with the ship-owners, have an explicit legal
responsibility to enforce the provisions of conventions.

However, disasters

surrounding the Erika incident, and more recently the Prestige, underscore that
despite the evolution of efforts, and the widening of the dragnet to deter, as well as
where necessary, eliminating sub-standard ships, catastrophes still occurs.

This

therefore begs the question as to the role of minor stakeholders, classification
societies, charterers, insurers, and financiers; since they do not have an explicit legal
responsibility, should they not feel obligated to exercise a moral or ethical
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responsibility for safety and environmental protection? The fact is that they are all
participating in the industry to make a profit, but use the insurance regimes as
insulation against the inevitable social cost of shipping.
The purpose of this study is to determine the role and responsibility of the minor
stakeholders in the elimination of substandard shipping, and its impact on their
pursuit for profitability in a very dynamic shipping industry.
In order to better understand the issues concerning quality shipping, it is important to
examine the fundamentals of the industry in which the ships operate. Hence the
nature of shipping and its economic importance is first examined; highlighting the
various shipping markets, the market dynamics, and the players that are prepared to
take the inherent risks and participate in the market. This provides a prelude to
understanding the ship-owners’ and minor stakeholders’ reaction to regulations.
Next, the industry’s regulatory regime concerning safety and environmental
protection is brought into perspective. Here the emphasis is placed on maritime law
and its evolution, as well as the nature, importance and validity of international law.
These laws form the basis on which governments put the reins on the industry and
seek to integrate safety issues in business activities and culture.
The role and responsibilities of the major stakeholders are then examined. Their
efforts and successes are determined and analysed, and their weaknesses established
both individually and collectively.

Efforts and measures already taken to address

the deficiencies are also outlined and the need for additional support from other
quarters in the elimination of substandard ships is emphasised. Next, the minor
stakeholders are brought into focus, where their interest and role in the industry are
examined. Competing interests are identified, particularly in response to maritime
safety regulations; and ways in which these interests can be best served whilst
making an active contribution in the elimination of sub-standard ships, are explored.

2

Finally, a holistic approach is used to analyse current trends and make
recommendations as to the way forward in achieving the goal of quality shipping,
emphasising a radical change of culture, prevailing in an atmosphere of transparency.
The propeller principle posited seeks to emphasise that the way ahead is through the
full participation from all stakeholders, which will serve as a force multiplier in the
policing of substandard ships.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ECONOMICS OF SHIPPING

2.1

The Nature of Shipping and its Economic Importance.

Since time immemorial, man’s quest to improve his living conditions has led to the
exploration and exploitation of natural resources with transportation being the
catalyst. With 75% of the earth’s surface covered by water, it is no wonder that
maritime transport realised significant development, as man’s hunger for power and
wealth extended to all corners of the globe. Today, 95% of world trade moves in
whole or in part by sea, thus making shipping the most international of all industries:
a ship, whatever its type, size or flag is nothing by itself, as its sole purpose is to
transport cargoes, equally world trade without shipping would quickly come to a halt
(Farthing & Brownrigg, 1997, p.1-2). With the volume of shipping expected to grow
even further as globalisation continues to spread1, creating trade flows requiring
transport, even more interest in shipping will be generated (Commission, 1996).
2.1.1

The Shipping Market

The shipping market, like any other market, is a place where the buyers, those people
demanding the service, communicate with the sellers, those people who supply the
ships, to make meaningful deals (Ma, 2002a, p.2). In a general sense, the shipping
market is a service-oriented single market, but made up of important commercial
subdivisions based on the type of ships and the trade requirements. Therefore, there
is the tramp market (bulk carriers), the liner market (container vessels), special or
industrial shipping market, and the passenger shipping market (Chrzanowski, 1985,
p.15). All these markets combined characterise the shipping industry. There are
several shipping companies that have the flexibility of operating in more than one
market, due to unique ship designs.
1

The world fleet now consists of around 88,000 ships (O’Neil, 2003, p.4)
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Therefore, in a depressed market, owners can move their investment from one
market sector to another to avoid problems. Consequently, supply and demand
imbalances in one part of the market can ripple across the other sectors (Neresian,
1981, p.75).
Stopford (2000, p. 6), quoting the Rochdale Report, aptly summarises the market:
Shipping is a complex industry and the conditions which govern it operations
in one sector does not necessarily apply to another; it might even, for the
purposes, be better regarded as a group of related industries. Its main assets,
the ship themselves, vary widely in size and type; they provide the whole
range of services for a variety of goods, whether over short or longer
distances…
2.1.2 The Dynamics of the Shipping Market.
The shipping industry is subjected to the economic forces of supply and demand like
all other industries; however, it is unique in the sense that the demand is derived
from the need to trade goods. Further, “ it can create new demand for trade, this is
not only in terms of reduced transport cost, it is also true in terms of newly developed
technology” (Ma, 2002a, p.21). Therefore, shipping will be affected by anything that
influences world trade, be it economic factors, political events and development,
natural causes, or technological advancements.
The fact that shipping is a service industry suggests that it should always provide the
best service at the lowest price; however, ship demand depends on several factors
including price, speed, reliability and security. It is important to note also that
political directorates also exert an influence on cost, price and free market
competition. Shippers always seek to get better and cheaper transport for their
goods, due to its correlation with profit margins. Likewise, ship-owners always seek
to get the highest possible freight rates. The final cost of shipping goods is reached
when there is equilibrium between supply and demand, a product of the free market
system.

5

Another phenomenon that is very much rooted in the culture of the industry is the
“market cycles”. The cycles, according to Stopford (2002), are the primary driving
force behind shipping investment and chartering.

The cycles cause cash to be

pumped in and out of the business, and forces companies to compete with each other
for a share of the wealth, thereby luring them in the direction needed to give the most
efficient use of the resources.
The cycles are created due to changes in the equilibrium between supply and demand
for ships. When demand increases faster than supply, freight rates move up to a
peak, conversely when supply exceeds demand freight rates are driven down by
competition. There is a time lag to the next equilibrium as supply is slow to react to
changes in demand; basically it takes time to construct new ships, this being the most
volatile period as everyone tries to maximize profits often resulting in an over supply
in the long run.
The cycles play a critical role in the overall economics of the industry. Though fairly
unpredictable, the general rule is that one occurs around every seven years. For
example, in 1999 a 280,000 dwt tanker was earning $9,000 a day, but just nine
months later in 2000, it was earning up to $90,000 a day: this signifies the
importance of cycles as it gives incentive for the prudent ship-owner to “play the
cycle” (Stopford, 2002, p.204).
2.1.3

Shipping Risk

All ship owners in the industry have to contend with shipping risk: the risk that an
investment in a ship, including the return on initial capital, is not recovered during
the period of ownership. Further, the market cycle, with its four distinct stages of a
trough, a recovery, a peak, and a collapse, dominates the shipping risk, with no firm
rules as to the length of time at each stage (Stopford, 2000, p.74). Predicting the
stages of the cycle and playing it is the key to success in the industry. With the
possibility of making a fortune during the recovery or at the peak of the cycle, allied
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with the freedom to enter or leave the market, the industry is inherently competitive.
This competitiveness is accentuated by the fact that the returns on investment in
shipping are lower than in other industries, averaging less than 10% per annum,
which translates to one ship-owner’s fortune being another ship-owner’s loss.
Therefore the stakes are high (Stopford, 2000, p.75).
2.2 The Players in the Maritime Industry
The ship is the focal point of the maritime industry, and has a very well defined life
cycle of design, construction, equipping, operation, and demolition. This life cycle
has spawned four distinct shipping markets trading in different commodities. The
freight market trades sea transport, the sale and purchase market trade in secondhand ships, the new-building market trades new ships and the demolition market
deals in scrap ships (Stopford, 2000, p.79).

These four markets make up the

maritime industry and give rise to a supporting cast with their own peculiar activities
directly related to the regulatory, commercial, technical, legal, and financial aspect of
the industry, all supporting the core function of transporting goods (Ma, 2002a).
Figure 2.1 shows the main relationships within the maritime industry.

Figure 2.1 Main relationship within the maritime industry
Source: Ma, 2002a p. 4.
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Shipping is generally free of regulatory market access barriers compared to other
modes of transportation. This implies that any operator, regardless of nationality and
location of his company, can provide international shipping services. However, in
reality, important restrictions remain and the danger of new restrictions is still
present (Commission, 1996). Other special features of the industry are that it is well
structured and organised internationally, and the main source of competition comes
from the relatively low operational costs and the possibility of capitalizing on
economies of scale, (Ma, 2002a, p.4-6). These features give the industry a distinct
character and cultivate unique cultures.
2.3 The Culture of the Industry
It has been demonstrated that the dominant culture in the industry is one of cost
directly linked to the elusive market cycles, with the focal point being the freight
rates. This is true right across the market spectrum, however, as O’Neil (2002)
rightly points out, “ safety and productivity should never be seen as opposing or
mutually exclusive objectives – because safety at the expense of commercial success
is no more desirable than corporate success at the expense of safety”.
The trans-national scope of the business and its significance as a major economic
force means that it cannot escape the attention of national and international political
influence. Stopford (2000, p.34) referring to the Rochdale Report, aptly describes
this relationship: “most of the industry’s business is concerned with international
trade and inevitably it operates within a complicated world pattern of agreements
between companies, understanding with shippers and policies with governments”.
With the devastating results in human casualties and significant damages to the
marine environment, from the numerous maritime accidents, more focus is now
being placed on cultivating a safety culture within the industry.
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2.4 International Shipping Standards
The complexity and diversity of the shipping industry dictates that for it to be
efficient it must operate within prescribed standards, which have to be international
in scope and nature. Enforcement of these standards is critical to improve safety and
fair competition in maritime transport (Commission, 1996). So far certain aspects of
the economic standards, which deal with commercial practices have been described.
However, there are two other categories that are of equal importance. These are,
social standards, which deal with the well being and treatment of seafarers, and the
safety and environmental standards, dealing primarily with the technical and
operational aspects of a ship or a shipping company (Ma, 2002b). Unfortunately not
all ship-owners give equal credence to all the categories, and often it is the economic
standards that take precedence over the others. However, the reality is that safety
and environmental issues cannot be separated from economic activities, simply
because the latter is the origin of the former (Pearce & Turner, 1990, p.36).
2.4.1

Safety and Other Quality Standards

Figure 2.2 categorises the key players within the industry that should play a role in
achieving the desired safety standards and other quality goals.

It shows the

stakeholders within the industry who have a critical role in ensuring quality shipping,
are divided into two main groups: the market forces group, comprising the charters,
insurers, et al; and the regulatory forces, consisting of flag state, port state, et al. The
generic sphere of influence of the classification societies is the market forces.
However, the regulatory forces group has delegated some functions to them, thereby
enabling them to essentially straddle both groups. All forces, under the influence of
public opinion seek to influence the behaviour of the ship-owner in meeting the
prescribed standards.
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Figure 2. 2 Achieving safety and other quality goals
Source: Verbeek (2000).

2.4.2

Stakeholders Defined

The role of the stakeholders and the effectiveness of the model in Figure 2.2 in
achieving the quality goals and standards, are critically analysed in subsequent
chapters.

However, in order facilitate this analysis, it is necessary to further

categorise the stakeholder within the context of the safety standards. Therefore,
those falling under the umbrella of the regulatory forces, because of their explicit
legal responsibilities, are classified as major stakeholders: this includes the shipowners, the primary subject of regulations. Those within the market forces group,
without this legal responsibility, but who should demonstrate an ethically
responsibility, are classified as minor stakeholders: for now, this includes the
classification societies since their generic function belongs to this group.
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CHAPTER 3
THE REGULATORY REGIME OF THE MARITIME INDUSTRY
AND RELATED ISSUES

3.1

National Significance of Shipping.

One of the products of civilisation is specialisation, and with it, at the domestic level,
came bartering, the earliest form of trade. With the ease of access to the sea and
waterways, at the regional level, particularly in Europe and the Mediterranean,
maritime transport allowed trade to flourish between civilised nations. In time States
realised that maritime expansion and improved maritime lines of communication
between each other were the keys to profit and power (Reynolds, 2000, p.3). This
spawned the epoch of exploration and conquest, as man sought to extend his horizon
beyond the near seas and bridge the divides of oceans, ushering the era of
colonisation; and with it came ocean trade, a further source of wealth and political
dominance.

Shipping became so important to the colonial powers, that they

developed large merchant fleets and naval forces to service and defend the
convergence of political, economic, trade and military/strategic objectives inherent in
their maritime interests (Gibson & Donovan, 2000, pp. 11, 26)2.
In the 19th century, the advent of industrialisation in the West and its dominance over
the rest of the world, shaped world economies. Further, this period showed an
unprecedented boom in the world exchange of goods and services (Harlaftis &
Theotokas, 2002, pp.9-10). The introduction of new technologies during this period
meant that ships were now larger and faster, supporting a world trade dominated by
the movement of industrial goods from Europe to the rest of the world, and the flow
of raw material in the opposite direction. The states that dominated shipping during
this period are referred to as Traditional Maritime States (TMS), which had
2

Referred to by Robins (2002).
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established a thriving business and support industry around ship construction and
operations. Post World War II saw several new independent States emerging with
hopes of prosperity and wealth similar to the West. These States, referred to as
developing nations, recognising shipping as the catalyst of economic development,
eagerly embarked on establishing ship registries to attract revenues.

These

developing nations soon gained notoriety as their established registries were referred
to as “open registries” and dubbed “flags of convenience”(FOC).
3.1.1

Shipping and Politics

Today the landscape of world trade is fashioned by globalisation, which represents a
new trend in moving either entire industries or parts of the production process to any
State globally that supports the most efficient utilisation of the factors of production3.
This phenomenon is only made possible due to modern efficient lines of
communication of which maritime transport plays an integral and dominant part.
Robins (2002, p. 33), in analysing the relationship between the maritime industry and
the power of States, highlights the fact that there are three pillars, political power,
economic power and military power, that enable nations to achieve their goals
internationally. He went on to explain that if any of these pillars are weakened or
removed, then there is corresponding structural weakening or collapse in the power
of the State. He further states that the military and economic pillars are directly
dependent on the maritime industry, while political power affects those pillars and is
influenced by them.
This leads us to examine in more detail the political dimension from the perspective
of the establishment and enforcement of maritime law. Given the international
nature of shipping, the only way to ensure that the various standards applied are
universal in scope, is through the application of international law, adopted by
international conventions, enforced through national legislations.

3

The factors of production are land, labour and capital.
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3.2

Maritime Law and its Evolution

Just as statutes developed as society evolved, simultaneous with the development and
expansion of trade and shipping came the development and evolution of maritime
law. Maritime law, initially exclusive in scope, evolved to what is now universally
accepted as international maritime law; a direct result of nations’ political will in
setting standards for mutual benefit.
Early maritime law can be traced to the Eastern Mediterranean, where under the
influence of the Phoenicians, the Greeks, the Rhodes, and later the Romans, saw the
establishment of standards based on the codification of customs and practices
(Farthing & Brownrigg, 1997, pp.2-7). Further, the earliest codes had traces of both
private and public law4. Elements of insurance law, rules relating to salvage and the
carriage of goods by sea, compensation for seamen lost or injured at sea, and so on,
represented private law. On the other hand, the protection by war ships of merchant
ships from pirates, so as to enable them to continue to trade, represents a form of
public law. These concepts further evolved to encompass (Farthing & Brownrigg,
1997, pp.2-7):
•

the treatment of shipwrecked sailors;

•

the jurisdiction of courts dealing in maritime matters;

•

rules regarding blockade and piracy;

•

the settlement of disputes relating to maritime contracts; and

•

the role of prize courts.

The fundamental principle of unmolested navigation, now referred to as “freedom of
the seas”, first established by the Greeks and later stoutly defended by Grotius5 when
the Portuguese attempted to alter to concept, survived the entire period of the rise and
4

Private law relates to the rules governing the relationship between private parties. Public law
governs the rights, duties and obligations of States.

5

Hugo Grotious in the early 17th century, through his famous book Mare Liberum, contested what
Portugal took upon itself the right to prohibit others from engaging in seaborne commerce in the East
Indies.
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fall of nations as maritime trading powers, with self-serving maritime pursuits
(Farthing, 1997, pp.6-7). However, today the principle of the freedom of the seas in
its widest context does not necessarily mean an absence of regulations, but that no
one State has the right unilaterally to regulate; any regulation must be for the good of
all (Farthing, 1997, p.10).
Colonization had the effect of spreading the fundamental principles of maritime law
globally, outside the realm of national and regional application in Europe and the
Mediterranean. Taking Britain as an example, where up to the middle of the 19th
century there were few rules and regulations, and virtually no construction or safety
standards for merchant ships: many ships were sent to sea badly built, ill found,
grossly overloaded and often over insured. However, this changed with the passage
of the “Plimsoll Act”6 in 1896, which was followed by a steady build up of other
maritime laws (Stopford, 2000, p. 440). Further, because Britain then dominated the
maritime scene, it was common for countries developing maritime interest to adopt
British law as a basis for drafting their own legislations.
At the end of the Second World War, newly independent states pursuing the
development of their maritime industry, and the exploitation of resources of the sea
and its subsoil, as well as efforts to enhance their security by extending the territorial
seas, brought into sharp focus the international application of maritime law. Nations
were forced to find mutually acceptable solutions in international law in order to
establish maritime delimitations, to prevent conflicts, and to enhance the sustainable
exploitation of the sea. As a result maritime law…“has taken on a new meaning, to
refer to the entire body of laws, rules legal concepts and processes that relate to the
use of marine resources, ocean commerce, and navigation” (Mukherjee, 2002a, p.1).

6

The Plimsoll Act empowered the British Board of Trade to survey ships, pass them fit for sea, and
have them marked with a load line indicating the legal limit to which they could be submerged.
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3.3

International Law

International law is a body of rules that nations are expected to and usually do
observe in their relations with one another, firmly grounded on the sovereign state
concept (Encarta, 2002). This definition is expanded to include the rule of law
relating to the functioning of international institutions or organisations, their relations
with each other, and their relations with states and individuals (Starke, 1989. p.3).
The importance of international law is underscored by Starke (1989, p.15) when he
states that, “in the absence of some system of international law, the international
society of states could not enjoy the benefits of trade and commerce, of exchange of
ideas, and of normal routine communication”.
Early international law consisted mostly of customary rules. These are rules that had
evolved after a long historical process culminating with the feeling of legal
obligation and recognition by the international community (Starke, 1989, p.35). By
the 19th century international law had expanded, primarily due to the emergence of
powerful new States, colonisation, modernisation of transport, the greater
destructiveness of warfare, and the influence of new inventions (Plant, 1998, p.14).
The 20th century witnessed an even greater impetus for further development, fuelled
by the growing interdependence of States and developments that overcame the
difficulties of time, space, and intellectual communication (Starke, 1989, p.15). The
rate of expansion and urgency during these periods called for a quicker means of law
making, as states could no longer rely on the slow process of customs for the
formation of international law (Plant, 1998, p.14). This resulted in greater emphasis
on multilateral treaties such as conventions, as another primary source of
international law.
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3.3.1

The Nature of International Law

The primary sources of the vast body of prevailing international laws are customs
and treaties, and it is the substance that will determine whether it is a public or
private treaty.

In addition, subsidiary sources are judicial decisions, awards of

arbitral tribunals and juristic opinions, and writing of distinguished publicists
(Mukherjee, 2002b). Further, treaty laws are contractual in nature and is therefore
binding only on States that become parties by acts of ratification or accession.7
However, regulations and procedures contained in treaties often developed into
general customary usage, hence considered to be binding even on those States that
did not sign and ratify them (Encarta, 2002).
There are also several other instruments generated by organs of international
institutions or other such law making bodies, which in the strict sense may not be
binding, but possess a persuasive character, often referred to as “soft law”. These
include resolutions, codes, recommendations, guidelines, etc, the legal effect of
which depends largely on the subject matter and the manner in which they are
adopted (Mukherjee, 2002b). Oftentimes nations may choose to incorporate soft law
instruments into their national maritime legislations thereby converting them into
enforceable laws in those States.
To some extent there is a machinery to enforce treaties, either arbitration or
conciliation procedure or the submission of the dispute to a regional or international
court. However, no court has the authority or power to give judgement backed by
coercive sanctions, therefore, a delinquent State may only be subjected to moral
sanctions, that is the public opinion of the civilised world; but in a world of
globalisation this could be just as punitive (Encarta, 2002).

7

There are several universal terms generated from the generic term “treaties “ which are conventions,
final acts, protocols, et al, all of which are contractual in nature (Mukherjee, 2002b).

16

3.3.2

Mechanism for Creating International Law

The United Nations (UN) is one of the primary mechanisms that articulate and create
international law (Encarta, 2002). However, international maritime law governs the
very wide and specialized activities of maritime transport and international seaboard
trade, which requires special attention. Consequently, the UN has delegated the role
and responsibility of the creation of international maritime law to the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO), two
of its specialised agencies. However, it is the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS) that provides the blue print for all maritime
conventions.
UNCLOS provides a comprehensive framework for the regulation of all ocean space
by establishing the limits of national jurisdiction over the ocean space, access to the
sea, navigation, and protection and preservation of the marine environment
(Stopford, 2000, p. 429). The provisions of UNCLOS are elaborated on in technical
conventions dealing with design, construction, manning, equipment and operation of
ships, promulgated by the IMO; and in conventions on working and living
conditions, social security and other standards for seafarers, established by the ILO
(Robins, 2002, p.15). This therefore means that the rights and responsibilities of
States, with an interest in maritime affairs, are embodied in the regime of
international maritime law with UNCLOS providing the umbrella framework.
3.3.3

Implementation of International Conventions

When a State becomes party to an international convention, the legal effect is that the
State then becomes bound by the convention and is therefore obliged to implement it
by incorporating it into its body of national law (Mukherjee, 2002b). Legislation
must properly reflect a convention’s provisions; provide the requisite legal and
administrative framework to enable effective discharge of State responsibilities;
provide effective sanctions against breaches; and provide control mechanisms such
as surveys, inspection and certification of ships to ensure compliance with technical
standards (Robins, 2002, p.18).
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It is important to note that in establishing its national maritime law, based on the
conventions, a State may incorporate requirements on matters that are not subject to
any international treaties or agreements. Further, the requirements laid down in
conventions are not always specific, but leave the States to specify more details.
Some regulations in maritime conventions require interpretation, which may be
expanded on in domestic legislation. Therefore, the requirements of a convention are
to be regarded as minimum requirements (Jansen, 1991).
If the State fails to implement the provisions of a convention in its national
legislation8, it is nevertheless subject to it vis a vis other State Parties, but it cannot
enforce the convention against them.

The implementation of an international

convention to which a State has become party is therefore an essential step without
which the State Party cannot benefit insofar as the application of the that law within
its jurisdiction is concerned (Mukherjee, 2002b).
3.3.4

The Validity of International Law

There has been much debate about whether international law is in fact law. One
school of thought says that there is no such thing as international law. This is
because there is no sanction for such law that can be binding upon nations. Others
say that it should be classified as a branch of ethics; as such, it is a code of rules of
conduct, of moral force only. This is supported by those who regard nothing as law
that is not the will of a political superior (Castel, 1976).
The counter arguments say that the doctrines of international law are founded on
legal, not simply on ethical ideas: they purport to be rules of strict justice, not
counsels of perfection. This is supported by the argument, that the only essential
condition for the existence of law is the existence of a political community, and its
recognition by its members of settled rules binding upon them in that capacity;
international law on a whole seems to satisfy these conditions (Castel, 1976).
8

The convention, when enacted in national law, provides the regime of constraint within which shipowners are required to operate (Stopford, 2000, p. 443).
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3.4. Safety and Environmental Protection in Perspective
The seas and oceans have and will always hold perils for those whose sail them. The
transition from adventurers who challenged the seas ill prepared and equipped, to the
more calculating merchants who use the seas for commerce; has seen an equal
transition of proficiency gained from experience, to deliberate attempts to regulate
shipping considering the safety of ships.

With the expansion of international

shipping came more awareness as the importance of having seaworthy ships for the
intended voyage to ensure the safety of crew, passengers, cargo and the environment.
This challenged the old modus operandi where the increase desire for profit
facilitated the scope for greater compromise of safety standards.
Despite this awareness, it was not until major disasters struck that claimed the lives
of many and severely damaged the marine environment, that significant efforts were
made to improve maritime safety and environmental protection. Therefore maritime
disasters such as the Titanic and the Torrey Canyon, and more recently the Herald of
free Enterprise and the Exxon Valdez have led to a plethora of safety and
environmental regulations aimed at spurring changes in the individual and collective
behaviour of those engaged in maritime activities.
Today the bulk of the maritime law produced focuses on all aspects of maritime
safety and environmental protection, and is constantly evolving due to the dynamic
nature of the shipping industry, particularly influenced by the changes in technology.
All these conventions prescribe the legal responsibilities for all the major
stakeholders who must take the prescribed action in order for the regulations to have
full and complete effect.

Maritime safety, pollution control and conditions of

employment, therefore strike at the heart of ship operating economics (Stopford,
2000, p. 443).
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3.5

Classification of Substandard Shipping

IMO resolution A.787(19), Procedures on Port State Control, defines a substandard
ship as one “whose hull, machinery, equipment or operational safety is substantially
below the standards required by the relevant convention”. This might be as a result
of the absence of such equipment or arrangements; or if these items do not comply
with the specifications of the regulations in force; or substantial deterioration of the
ship or its equipment due to wear and tear or poor maintenance (Ulstrup, 2002).
The lack of valid certificates constitutes prima facie evidence that a ship may be
substandard and will form the basis of a decision to carry out a more detailed
inspection or to detain the ship. The word “substantially”, as used in the definition,
is so broad, that it is incumbent on the surveyor to exercise his professional
judgement to determine whether the deficiencies as a whole or individually make the
ship unseaworthy9, and would put at risk the life of persons on board if it were to
proceed to sea (Ulstrup, 2002).

This presents a potential problem due to the

subjectivity of the interpretation of whether or not the various standards have been
adequately met.
3.6

The Cost of Shipping Regulations

The cost associated with international safety regulations can be quite high, the brunt
of which is borne by the ship-owner. These costs can be divided into, preventative
and appraisal cost (e.g. design, training, equipment, etc) and failure cost (e.g. design
failures, client rejects, etc): if there is no quality investment in the former then the
latter will be very high.

Therefore, a high initial preventative and appraisal

investment is needed in order to reduce the failure cost to an acceptable level
(Reynolds, 2000, p.26). Though the initial high investment in quality results in lower
short-term profits, once this implementation phase has passed, quality cost is
continuously reduced and failure costs steadily decline, which in the long run should
result is an increased profit margin.
9

Seaworthy means that the ship is capable of combating and enduring the ordinary perils of the sea on
the intended voyage (Ulstrup, 2002).
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CHAPTER 4
THE REALITIES AND PERFORMANCE OF THE MAJOR
STAKEHOLDERS

4.1

The Legal Responsibilities

When we consider the safety and environmental protection aspects of shipping, the
phrase “quality shipping” is synonymous with the objective of the numerous
conventions promulgated10.

In reality, quality shipping requires the complex

interaction of a number of parties to achieve and maintain it. Using the analogy of a
building, the standards found in international conventions, regulations and codes,
provide the foundation on which the pillars are placed to support the roof, in this case
quality shipping (North, 1999).
Several pillars are required to effectively support this roof; in effect these pillars
represent all the stakeholders in the industry both major and minor. However, it is
the major stakeholders that comprise the most prominent pillars by virtue of their
explicit legal responsibilities within the regulatory regime. Therefore, flag states,
port states, the ship owners and the IMO, all have peculiar but complementing
responsibilities that provide the framework to ensure quality shipping.
4.2

The International Maritime Organization (IMO).

The IMO was established to develop international maritime laws to replace the
comparatively few international treaties that were neither widely accepted nor
implemented, but were superimposed on the very diverse and oftentimes
contradictory national maritime laws11. It was generally accepted then, that the

10

Appendix 1 shows a summary of the status of Conventions as at 30 June 2003 (IMO, 2003b)

11

In 1958 the predecessor to the IMO, the Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation
(IMCO) was established, however, since in 1982 there was only a name change to the IMO, with the
primary mandate still intact, then it can be considered that the IMO has been in existence since 1958.
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existing state of affairs was damaging to shipping safety at the global level, because
standards were often very different, with some being far higher than others. This
meant that ship-owners who spent relatively little money on safety had an economic
advantage over their more conscious rivals, thus threatening any serious attempt to
improve shipping safety (IMO, 2003).
The IMO is responsible for adopting legislations on matters relating to maritime
safety, environmental pollution prevention, and other areas relating to the operation
and facilitation of maritime traffic on a worldwide basis, and to act as the custodian
of a number of related international conventions (Jensen, 1991).

This is

complemented by the work of the International Labour Organization (ILO), which is
engaged in the promotion of standards of working and living conditions on board
ships, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)12,
which has produced Conventions of a commercial nature.
The IMO collectively represents 162 member governments13, which have adopted
around 40 conventions and protocols; most having been amended several times to
reflect the dynamics of international shipping (Winbow, 2002). The vast majority of
maritime nations have ratified14 the most important conventions, as shown in
Appendix 2.

12

UNCTAD was particularly active between the 1960s and the mid 1980s when it produced a number
of international conventions, the most popular being the Code on Conduct for Liner Conferences.
After UNCTAD IX (1996) the committee was discontinued, because of changes in both the political
and economic environment (Ma, 2002a).
13

IMO now has 162 member States and three associate members, which are: Faroe Islands
(Denmark); Hong Kong (China); Macau (China). (IMO, 2003c, p.7).
14

Ratification is an act whereby a State establishes, on the international plane, its consent to be bound
by a treaty (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969).
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4.2.1 The IMO in Focus
Conventions produced by the IMO represent the deliberation, compromise and
consensus of the member States, with the added benefits of consultation and direct
input of non-governmental organisations15. The general view is that the IMO has
made tremendous strides over the years in fulfilling its mandate geared towards
achieving safer ships and cleaner oceans. This is reflected in the wide acceptance of
IMO measures (Appendix 1), recognised as being sensible, practical, and of a high
standard. In fact most of these measures are mandatory in so many countries that it
is now commercially important for ships to conform to them (IMO, 2003a).
However, the IMO remains in the spotlight because despite the proliferation of
regulations and standards, sub-standard shipping continues to exist, causing several
aspects of IMO’s work to be placed under the microscope over the years.
To be fair, it is important to remember that the IMO is in a position of weakness
rather than strength in the relationship it maintains with its members, since it does
not have any authority to coerce them into having the conventions adopted or
implemented. Even those members that do ratify conventions face no penalties or
sanctions if they fail to subsequently comply with them.
4.2.2

Over Regulation and Other Issues

The cardinal charge brought against the IMO is that the shipping industry is over
regulated. Its cause is the proverbial “knee jerk” reaction by member states in the
aftermath of a major accident, primarily dictated by political expediency and emotive
responses, rather than technical rationale or successful performance (Classification,
It’s time…, 2003). The sincerity of the efforts to genuinely improve the safety and
environmental protection is recognised, but the tendency is to overcompensate for
insufficient compliance by creating yet more rules, which appears to create further
economic incentives for the unscrupulous rule-breakers (Netelenbos, 1999).
15

There are 61 non-governmental organisations, articulating the interests of their members. They are
actually associations representing the wide cross section of the industry’s players, including ship
owners, insurance companies, classification societies, shipbuilders, et al.
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The IMO, recognising this deficiency and identifying that the lack of effective
implementation was its root cause, established the Flag State Implementation (FSI)
Sub-committee in 1992 to address this and other related issues. The Sub-Committee
has progressively discharged its mandate, producing important guidelines and
recommendations16. One of the significant measures taken is the adoption of the
Formal Safety Assessment (FSA)17 for use in the IMO rule making process. It is a
structured and systematic methodology, aimed at enhancing maritime safety,
including protection of life, health, the marine environment and property, by using
risk and cost/benefit analysis (Rasmussen, 2002). This represented a shift from the
traditional reactionary approach to a more proactive policy. In the opinion of Storey
(1999), the FSA is specifically designed to look objectively at the shipping industry
to ensure that new regulations are kept to a minimum and that any new regulation
that is developed is well focused and will be effective.
Also of consequence is the introduction of the Flag State Self-assessment Form and
procedures. The Secretary-General answered the questions regarding its benefits
when he said that it would serve to assist flag states in obtaining a clear picture of
how well they are functioning, compared to the agreed criteria, and based on any
assessed deficiencies, take appropriate actions to receive assistance to close the
identified gaps. In addition, it could be used as the basis for bilateral discussions,
between flag and port states, to adopt a co-operative approach towards enhanced
safety and environmental protection (Plaza, 1999).

16

The IMO Assembly, the MSC and the MEPC have adopted some as resolutions, while others have
taken the form of IMO circulars (Hoppe, 2000).

17

The FSA was approved as outlined in MSC/Circ.1023-MEPC/Circ.392 dated 5th April 2002 and
supersedes MSC/Crc.829-MEPC/Circ.335 on Interim Guidelines for the application of FSA.
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Another noteworthy development is the harmonisation of ships statutory surveys
under SOLAS 74, MARPOL 73/78 and Load Line 66 Conventions18. This has
brought benefits to all the major stakeholders where: it reduces the economic burden
on the ship-owner by decreasing the number of time the ship has to be surveyed; it
enables flag states to exercise better control since all surveys are done at the same
time; and when fed into a data base, it facilitates effective port state control.
Despite these noble efforts, the implementation dilemma continues to be a problem
and, as such, other efforts have been taken to bring the efficacy of quality shipping to
the industry. O’Neil (1999), confirming this observation said:
…there is a general agreement that we cannot continue to promote safety
simply by imposing more and more legislation upon the shipping industry.
This adds to the regulatory burden without any guarantee of it being effective.
Instead we have to make sure that existing legislation is implemented more
effectively… the measures taken by the IMO to improve flag State
performance, the development of regional port State control systems, the
entry into force of the ISM Code and the revision of the 1978 STCW
Convention are all part of this process and can be expected to lead to
improvements in the years to come.”
4.2.3

Unilateralism and Regionalism

The role of the IMO is often challenged by States taking unilateral actions and by
regions with political unions implementing regional policies and regulations, even
with the universal and profound recognition of the international nature of shipping.
The danger is that a national or regional approach can only lead to clashes, an
unworkable situation for shipping, and regulatory chaos (Farthing & Brownwigg,
1997). In some cases they may also result in retaliatory measures, which will have
negative commercial consequences.

18

This came into effect by Resolution A.746(18): Surveys guidelines under the harmonisation system
of surveys and certification
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The rationale appears to be the relatively long time it takes for meaningful action via
the IMO, when political expediency to appease the anxiety and outrage of their
nationals, whether real or perceived, is given the highest priority. The subsequent
tabling of the provisions of their regulations in the IMO, in order to gain international
legitimacy, is a manifestation of this hypothesis. An example is the United States
(US) OPA’90, which came on the heels of the Exxon Valdez casualty19. The pressure
was so great that unilateral action was seen as the best solution, with the law binding
on all foreign ships operating in US ports. However, when the dust settled, and the
reality that casualties involving foreign vessels operating beyond US jurisdiction can
still affect its shores, efforts were then made to internationalise many of the law’s
provisions through the IMO mechanism, particularly the issue of tankers having
double hulls (Sipes, 1991).
Another rationale for operating outside the auspices of the IMO appears to be
interpretation or perceptions that a particular IMO Convention does not adequately
address certain issues. This is exemplified in the recent European Commission’s
(EC) proposed Directive on criminalising marine pollution20.

The proposed

Directive is based on the assumption that the enforcement of MARPOL 73/78 is not
strong or consistent enough and that the Civil Liability Conventions and their
attending Funds do not provide enough deterrents to would-be polluters (Gavin,
2003).

Regardless of plausible rationale, any new measures to ensure quality

shipping must be taken under the auspices of the IMO in order to avoid mistrust and
resentment. It is the IMO that is uniquely equipped to deal with most shipping
issues, and is in the best berth to develop sound positions that have global consensus
(Paniguian, 1999).

19

The Exxon Valdez accident occurred in Prince William Sound, Alaska, spilling 11 million gallons or
257,000 barrels of crude, impacting nearly 1,300 miles of coastline, killing hundreds of thousand of
wildlife, and costing about $2.1 billion to cleanup (Retrieved from: http://www.oilspill.state.ak.us)
20

This is the result of a hardening in attitude by the European Member States with respect to pollution
in the aftermath of both the Erika and Prestige incidents, where both the environmental and economic
impact, particularly the cost of clean up, were exorbitant
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4.3

Flag State Control

A State must exercise control over ships entitled to fly its flag, by using the
jurisdiction inherent its sovereign right as a State to give full and complete effect to
the provisions of conventions. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of
Treaties, 1969 specifies that, “every treaty in force is binding upon the Parties to it,
and must be performed by them in good faith”. This is further qualified by Article
29, which states that, “unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is
otherwise established, a treaty is binding upon each party in respect to its entire
territory”. To accomplish this task, States must establish a viable, competent and
empowered national system or authority that will be responsible for administering
and enforcing their national maritime laws; which should ultimately be supported by
an efficient judicial and penal system.
4.3.1

The Question of Nationality.

A ship is a unique creature, because under domestic maritime law it is considered to
be both a property and a business venture, while on the international scene it assumes
a profile akin to a person, requiring a nationality. In essence, a merchant ship on the
high seas has to possess a nationality to be able to prove its existence in order to
ensure that each vessel will be subjected to some regulatory scheme and system of
law (Özcayir, 2001). This concept is supported by Mukherjee (1993); who opines
that, “a ship must, of necessity, be subject to some legal regime at all times. In
waters other than the high seas, a ship could well be subject to laws of a littoral
state… But upon the high seas without he benefit of flag or nationality, she would,
metaphorically speaking, floating in a legal vacuum”.

Article 91 of UNCLOS

prescribes the process for a State to confer nationality on a vessel. It states that:
1. Every State shall fix conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for
the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag.
Ships shall have the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to
fly. There must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship.
2. Every State shall issue to ships to which it has granted the right to fly its
flag documents to that effect.
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4.3.2

The Question of Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction is predicated on the fundamental principle of a State’s sovereignty,
which is the supreme political power in a State: that is power to govern without
external control. In international law, jurisdiction21 describes the power of the State
to exercise its authority by means of legislative, executive or judicial action, over
persons and property by the use of its national law (Özcayir, 2001, p.61). Again,
because of the international nature of shipping, a State must conform to provisions of
UNCLOS Article 94, outline in Appendix 3, in order to fully discharge its duties. In
executing these provisions, States are required to conform to the general accepted
international regulations, procedures and practices, and to take steps that may be
necessary to secure their observance.
UNCLOS Article 217 further expands the duties of the flag State wherein they are to
ensure that their ships:
1. Comply with all applicable international rule and standards for the
prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment,
and they shall adopt laws and regulations and take other necessary
measures for their implementation and enforcement; and
2. Are prohibited from sailing, until they can proceed to sea in compliance
with the requirements of the international rules and standards, including
requirements in respect of design, construction, equipment and manning.
4.3.3

The Maritime Administration

The Maritime Administration (MA) is that arm of a State’s government that is
entrusted with the responsibilities for the administrative, technical and social matters
concerning ships flying its flag and other maritime activities. It therefore means that
the Administration must be structured to deal effectively, either directly or indirectly,
with the entire duties outlined in Article 94, et al. This must be balanced against the
21

Under International law there are five generally accepted bases of jurisdiction for a State: 1. The
territorial principle, jurisdiction over crime committed in its territory; 2. The national principle, a
State can punish its nationals for offences on the sole basis of nationality; 3.The protective principle,
an act committed outside its territory which is deemed prejudicial to security, integrity or vital
economic interest; 4. The passive personality principle; a State can claim jurisdiction on the basis of
the nationality of the actual or potential victim; 5. The universal principle; a State has jurisdiction to
try particular offences, like piracy and war crimes, irrespective of nationality (Özcayir, 2001, pp.6162).
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national economic development aspect of shipping, which often creates full
compliance problems.
Compliance with national maritime law is achieved through a system of periodic
surveys and physical inspections of the ships and their systems. Once the MA is
satisfied that the standards are met or have been exceeded, a certificate is issued as
evidence of compliance. Some of these duties are often delegated to recognised
organisations (ROs), normally classification societies, because of limited technical
resources and the lack of global reach. This practice has become so widespread, and
with the inherent risk of dereliction of duties so great, it was necessary for the IMO
to develop guidelines on the monitoring of ROs22.
The MA has to guarantee fully the completeness and efficiency of the surveys
performed by the ROs, therefore it must at least possess the necessary monitoring
skills and resources, and where necessary require remedial action or impose
appropriate sanctions against identified breaches. The problem is that many States,
particularly emerging flag states, fail to meet even these minimum criteria.
4.3.4

Registration of Ships

It is through the process of registration that nationality is conferred on a ship.
Registration then represents an administrative act whereby pertinent data on the
vessel, having fulfilled the relevant national requirements, is entered into the public
records. This act bestows nationality, along with its collateral rights and duties, on
the vessel, thereby bringing it under the national jurisdiction of the State (Özcayir,
2001, p.10).
According to Mukherjee (1993, p.32), registration has both a public and private law
function. The public law function is concerned with administrative matters pertaining

22

This is achieved through IMO Resolutions A.739 (18) and A.789 (18).
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to the national interest comprising, inter alia: conferment of nationality and the right
to fly the national flag; national regulatory jurisdiction over matters such as maritime
safety, pollution control, manning and labour conditions, and shipboard discipline;
the right to diplomatic protection including consular services; the right of the ship to
naval protection; and the right to engage in cabotage activities. While the private law
function is concerned with the protection of the private proprietary interest in the
ships, such as providing prim facie evidence of title and ownership; and protecting
the interests and priority ranking of holders of security interests in ships, such as
mortgages and hypotheques.
International law only dictates that flag States should maintain a register of ships
flying its flag; it is therefore incumbent on individual States to determine the size and
structure of its registry. However, international law does require that there must be a
“genuine link” between ship and State, the interpretation of which appears to be the
primary influence on how a ship registry is classified.
4.3.5

The Concept of Genuine Link

Despite the very definitive requirement for the existence of a genuine link between a
ship and the State that is conferring nationality, the convention provides no
explanation as to the meaning of “genuine link”; neither does it address possible
consequences for not having it. There have been numerous debates on the issue
without a final consensus as to a definite meaning. However, according to Churchill,
(2000, pp.4-5) the following legitimate conclusions may be drawn:
1. The granting of nationality through registration obviously creates a link
between the ship and State, but it requires conditions that demonstrate
that the link is real, not artificial, causal or tenuous.
2. There is no single or obligatory criterion by which the genuineness of a
link is to be established. A State has the discretion as to how it ensures
that the link between itself and a ship is genuine be it through the
requirements relating to the nationality of the beneficial owner or crew,
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its ability to exercise its jurisdiction over such a ship, or in some other
way.
3

Although it is not an obligatory criterion for the establishing the
genuineness of a link, the effective exercise of jurisdiction and control
over its ships is one of the principal ways in which a flag State may
demonstrate that the link between itself and the ship is genuine23.

4.3.6

Types of Ship Registries

The onus is on the flag state to determine the type of ship registry that it operates.
This is certainly influenced by how a State projects the national significance of
shipping, which in turn shapes the national laws to exercise exclusive jurisdiction.
All this is predicated by the States own interpretation of the ambiguous requirements
for the genuine link, and its own conviction of international ethics and moral
obligations. In the early years international shipping was dominated by the closed
registries (national registries), which later saw the emergence and proliferation of the
“open registries” commonly referred to as “flags of convenience” (FOC).

As

shipping continued to evolve the secondary registry, the hybrid registry, and the
unique bareboat charter registration, emerged as flagging options (Mukherjee, 1993).
Appendix 4 summarises the profile and characteristics of the different types of ships
registries.
4.3.7

Flag State Control in Focus

The well-defined and comprehensive guidelines for flag state control represent the
battle plan for an offensive assault on substandard ships, if all the provisions are
implemented uniformly and consistently. In an imperfect world this would be asking
too much, so while many flag states do have good reputations recognised by both the
industry and the general public, others are guilty of delinquency. They fail to

23

For this to be convincing, a State must be able to show that the necessary mechanisms are in place
at the time when the ship is granted nationality. Such mechanisms could include sufficient and
suitably qualified personnel for carrying out the necessary surveys of the ships, checking the
certificates of crew, et cetera.
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exercise effective jurisdiction over their ships, or to take action against negligence on
the part of ship owners and other parties (Boisson, 1999, p.423). The number of
vessels detained worldwide for regulatory non-compliance clearly indicates the
performance of quite a few flag states is still less than satisfactory24 (Paniguian,
1999). The consequence of this dilemma is that substandard ships continue to roam
the seas, resulting in the employment of more defensive tactics.
It is clear that some flag states have been surfing on the sentimental wave of an over
regulated shipping industry. This is inferred from remarks made by Streeter (1999,
p.2) when he says, the explosion in technology has caused the creation of new, and
the amendments of existing conventions, which are sometimes outdated by the time
they are implemented. This makes it extremely difficult for many member states to
develop the requisite national legislation in a timely manner. The argument of “too
much too soon” is also used by some to argue against any changes, thereby avoiding
the increased costs of compliance. What is conclusive, however, is that there is often
a major divide between States motivated by strong environmental and safety
concerns, and those with different priorities and realities, including off-shore
registries, financial considerations, and insufficient capacity of their maritime
administrations.
The performance of FOC remains in the spotlight because of the stigma of lax
standards, which attract the very same ships that are so despised by the industry as a
whole. It is said that the principal motivating force for ship-owners to register their
ships in a FOC state is commercial, as owners can usually expect low taxes,
minimum bureaucracy, cheaper crewing and registration fees, and a relaxed approach
to regulatory enforcement (Registries, sitting on…, 2003).
At a glance one might concur with the negative image, certainly from the public
perspective, in light of the series of disasters, from the Torrey Canyon in 1967 to the
24

In 2002 the Paris MOU alone had a total of 1,577 detentions (Paris MOU, 2002).
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more recent Prestige in 2002. In fact an analysis covering the period 1970 to 1983
indicated that the casualty rate for the FOC fleet was substantially higher than for
regulated fleets and the world average (Boisson, 1999, p.427). However, some
experts agree that criticism of free registers on safety grounds is unfounded. This
attitude, according to Boisson (1999, p.428), is based on several arguments: a few of
the most modern ships today sail under FOC, in fact many of these registers have
taken steps to ban the transfer of registration for old ships25; and the leading open
registry States are parties to the main international conventions on safety at sea. In
addition, a report published in May 199426, puts open registry flags into three
categories: those with the worst casualty rates, those with fairly close to world
average, and those that have the safest fleets in the world.
Cockroft, (1999) also offering his views on the FOC saga, points out that not all FOC
ships are substandard and not all substandard ships fly FOC flags, but the existence
of the FOC system is central to the problem. It allows operators to choose their own
regulators and to escape from those that cause them too much trouble. It also permits
states that boast of their national sovereignty and their credentials as developing
countries to subcontract their responsibilities to private companies entirely driven by
profit motives.
4.4

Coastal States Rights and Responsibilities.

It is important to distinguish the fact that not all flag states are coastal states, because
UNCLOS Article 90 states, that “every state, whether coastal or landlocked, has the
right to sail ships flying its flag on the high seas”. Coastal states do not exert the
same regulatory influence on the shipping industry as port states do, therefore they
were not considered as major stakeholders. On the other hand, because most port
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The limit is 20 years for Liberia, Panama and Vanuatu, between 17 and 23 for Cyprus, and 23 for
the Bahamas (Boisson, 1999).
26

This is a French Senatorial report which admits that “ a lax attitude in applying safety rules is not, it
seems most likely, the sole responsibility of States which have an open registry flag” (Boisson, 1999,
p.428)
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states are in fact coastal states, it is therefore important to be cognizant of the rights
and responsibilities of coastal states as provided for by UNCLOS under the various
established maritime zones, which is outlined in Appendix 5.
4.5

Port State Control

Once a ship enters the seaward boundary of the demarcated limits for a port its
passage ceases to be innocent; it enters the port under the terms and conditions
governing access, and in so doing it becomes subjected to the full jurisdiction of that
sovereign state. However, if a ship enters a port to seek refuge due to the stress of
weather or force majeure, the State should not take punitive action for any
infractions committed unintentionally. Within this context, Port State Control (PSC)
is the inspection of foreign ships in national ports for the purpose of verifying that
the condition of the ship and its equipment comply with the requirements of
international conventions and that the ship is manned and operated in compliance
with applicable international laws. Port states exercise control based on the principle
that it will recognise the international certificates issued by, or on behalf of, the flag
states.
4.5.1

Port State Control Jurisdiction

UNCLOS Article 25 empowers States to take the necessary steps to prevent any
breach of the conditions to which a vessel is subjected to during a port call. Articles
216 and 218 enable a port state to enforce anti-dumping and anti-pollution measures
respectively, while Article 219 enables measures to be taken to control the movement
of a vessel whose seaworthiness threatens to damage the environment. These articles
provided the earliest means for a State to exercise PSC (Hare, 1999), which has since
evolved to become the first line of defence against substandard ships. Consequently,
there are more direct and effective powers gained through the relevant conventions.
However, a State cannot exercise PSC unless it is party to those conventions and has
promulgated the requisite national legislations. The relevant conventions containing
provisions that permit port state control are outlined in Appendix 6.
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The execution of PSC involves the boarding, inspection, remedial action, and
possible detention of ships, only by port state control officers (PSCOs) duly
authorised by the port state (Hoppe, 2002b). Certificates, if valid, shall be accepted
unless there are clear grounds for believing that the conditions of the ship or its
equipment or manning does not correspond substantially with the particulars of any
of the certificates or that the ship or its equipment or manning are not in compliance
with the provisions (Jensen, 1999).
4.5.2

Memoranda of Understanding

Unilateral port state control had an immediate impact on substandard shipping,
despite the negative aspect of the variance of inspection standards and procedures
being applied by States, which caused much frustration particularly among owners
who consistently practise quality shipping. Fortunately, it was quickly recognised
that a more regional approach would even have a more dramatic impact on
substandard shipping, whilst somewhat appeasing the frustrated owners. This was
underscored by Hoppe (2000b) when he remarked that, “Unless a regional approach
is adopted, operators will just divert their ships to ports in the region where no or less
stringent PSC inspections are conducted”.

The first regional memorandum of

understanding (MOU) on port state control was the Paris MOU, adopted on 01 July
1982 with the objective of assisting in securing compliance of ships with
international standards regarding safety of life at sea and prevention of pollution of
the marine environment.
The success and efficiency of the Paris MOU, with ten years of refinement, became
the template for successive agreements, as its efficacy reverberated throughout the
industry. Spurred on by the IMO, within seven years there were six other MOUs
established globally, with two further agreements, the Persian Gulf region and the
Black Sea, under development27. Starting with the Vina del Mar or the LatinAmerica Agreement on 5 November 1992, the additional MOUs cover Asia-Pasific,
27

This is based on an update on IMO’s work (Hoppe, 2000).

35

the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean including East Africa, and the
West and Central African Region (Hoppe, 2002b). Appendix 7 shows that what is
emerging is the progressive globalisation of MOUs. Their inherent principles will be
enhanced by cross fertilisation, as more States become members of several MOUs.
.
4.5.3

The Principles of the Regional Agreements

The principles of the regional cooperation on PSC start with the constant exchange of
information about ships, their records and the results of inspections carried out, using
a secretariat as the focal point for the correlation of data and the formulation of
statistics. This enables subsequent ports of call to target only ships that have not
recently been inspected. In general, ships inspected within the previous six months
are not re-inspected unless there are clear grounds to do so. One of the positive
effects of these principles is that identified sub-standard ships can be effectively
monitored, particularly ships that have been allowed to sail with certain minor
deficiencies on the condition that they are rectified in the next port of call (Hoppe,
2002b). Perhaps the most important benefit is that PSC inspections are carried out in
a uniform manner in all states party to the agreement, and that similar standards are
applied in respect to detention of ships and the training of PSCOs.
4.5.4

Port State Control in Focus

It is very difficult to be overly critical of PSC when it really is a complement to Flag
State Control (FSC), the one with the ultimate responsibility for maintaining
standards. However, what is clearly evident is that PSC provides a means for States
to preserve their maritime interest whilst effectively complementing other national
and international regulatory regimes.

This is why many states, despite severe

resource constraints, still dedicate time, effort and money in effective PSC.
Regional agreements, though quite effective, have the inherent risk of hampering the
economic situation of ports of those States that do conduct proper inspections
(Hoppe, 2002b). This is basically a balloon effect, as when pressure is applied to one
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end the other end bulges. This highlights the need for inter-regional cooperation, as
when the pressure is applied in one region, substandard ships will simply move to
other regions taking the economic benefits with it.
This is why it is encouraging to see the trend towards a global PSC, where
information will be shared using a standard format, and inspection procedures and
training will be harmonised. Also knowledge about sub-standard shipping will be
greatly increased as the different PSC secretariats make available statistics and data
through a global computer network. This knowledge will facilitate effective analysis
of the causes of incidents and casualties, which can then be used for proactive
planning in accident prevention28 (Hoppe, 2002b).
4.6

Ship Owners

Ship-owners are the ones that ultimately decide whether a ship will be substandard or
not. With the ship being the primary object of the regulatory regime, it is the
owner’s response to these regulations, whether he gives full and complete effect or
he seeks means of shirking the responsibilities, which decides the fate of the vessels.
There appears to be a clear correlation between the structures of ownership, the
market the ship operates in, choice of flag, and the response to the regulatory
standards.
4.6.1

Structures of Ownership

At one end of the spectrum ship ownership comprises small companies owning
anywhere from one to ten ships, with most engaged in tramping, loosely structured
and often a one-man enterprise: in such cases, one individual, who does his own
chartering and arranges his insurance, usually owns the ships (Young, 1982). At the
other end of the spectrum is the large and highly sophisticated company operating
anywhere from fifty to one hundred and fifty ships worldwide in the liner trade.
28

This movement is evidently supported by the IMO through initiates such as the passage of
Resolution A.787(19) “Procedure for PSC”, as amended by Resolution A. 882(21) among others.
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Within this spectrum a company structure varies depending on the type of registry: in
the closed registries the beneficial owner is relatively traceable, while in the open
registries the beneficial owner is hidden behind holding and management companies
(Stopfort, 2000, p.438).
Ship-owners, in an attempt to make up for the decline in the freight rates29, started to
routinely use old ships, cut maintenance costs to a minimum, recruit cheap
manpower, and sub-contract to Management Companies certain expenses that weigh
too heavily on the operating costs30.

However, unbridled competition among

management companies in the last few years has led unscrupulous owners to use
managers that charge extremely low fees (Boisson, 1999, p. 418). These extremely
low fees could very well be the result of cost cutting measures that impact on the safe
operation of the vessel.
What is alarming is the number of investment groups that purchase and trade ships
for short-term financial gains, with little or no commitment to the operation, safety or
crew’s welfare (Patwardhan, 1999). The trading of ships, buying second-hand or
even third-hand, is often accompanied by the transfer of flag or class, which have
been regarded as flagrant examples of the use of FOC, and very dangerous for safety.
Of the 182 ships lost in 1991, 92 had undergone one or more changes of ownership
in the previous 5 years; while in 17 cases the exact number of transfers could not be
established (Boisson, 1999, p. 419).

29

The persistent crisis, which began in the mid seventies, led to overcapacity that is responsible for
the steady decline in freight rates.

30

By accumulating competence and putting it into the system, and utilizing economies of scale
inherent in large scale operations, Management Companies are able to do the job more effectively
than owners (Branch, 1998, pp. 251-252). The services provided include: crew management, technical
management (ship equipment and maintenance, purchasing, insurance, dry docking, cost accounting)
and commercial management (charter prospection) (Boisson, 1999, p. 418).
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4.6.2

Ship-Owners’ Choice of Markets

As previously outlined, not all shipping markets are the same. It appears therefore,
that the ship-owners’ choice of market does exert some amount of influence on the
owners or managers perspective and commitment to quality shipping.

In the

passenger shipping market ships are operated at a very high standard because a
serious accident could have dire consequences for the entire industry. Similarly, in
specialised or industrial shipping markets, where the cost of compliance can easily be
absorbed by the parent industry, and where reputation is paramount, there is high
compliance, oftentimes with ships operating well above international standards.
In the liner market freight rates are fairly stable because the bulk of the traffic comes
from a host of small shippers, which allows ship-owners to estimate how much their
customers are prepared to pay and fix their rates accordingly31 (Branch, 1998).
Therefore, ships are generally operated at international standards. In the tramp
market freight rates are volatile due to the competitive nature of the market.
Consequently it is in this market that ship-owners are most likely to find all
conceivable means of cutting operating costs to keep their ships employed and
increase profit margins.

Therefore, the tramp market is most likely to spawn

substandard ship-owners, but the reality is that substandard ship-owners are in the
minority.
4.6.3

Owners Choice of Flags

Faced with the dynamics of the shipping market and the reality of the
interdependence between regulations and ship operating economics, a ship-owner
must make choices in the interest of accomplishing the company’s objective.
Predominantly, the objective is to reduce operating costs to realise a profit and thwart
the threat of bankruptcy (Patwardhan, 1999). One such choice is deciding under
what flag he can register his ship, which he executes by weighing-up the relative
31

The liner market is dominated by shipping conferencing, pools, alliances, consortia, et al, which
also contribute to freight stabilisation (Ma, 2002, p.100).
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advantages and disadvantages of each of the alternatives, each representing the cost
of compliance. According to Stopford (2000, p. 434) the principal consequences of
his choice are:
1. Tax, company law and financial law: These laws will determine the
company’s liability to pay tax and may impose regulations in areas
such as company organisation, auditing of accounts, employment of
staff, and limitation of liability.
2. Compliance with maritime safety conventions: Where international
standards are rigidly enforced, ship-owners have no alternative but to
maintain high standards in the operation of their ships. Conversely,
States with a weak regulatory system or no means to enforce it, may
allow owners to cut corners to save on equipment and maintenance.
3. Crewing and terms of employment: The ship-owner has to abide by
the flag state’s regulation on the selection of crew and their terms of
employment, which can vary from the employment of only nationals
to very open multinational crews.
4. Naval Protection: Although the benefits of naval protection seem less
of a consideration these days, the war between Iran and Iraq in the
1980s, when ships changed to the US flag in order to gain protection,
exemplifies its relevance.
4.6.4 Ship Owners in Focus
Substandard ship-owners must realise that the regulatory dragnet is rapidly closing
due to the offensive and defensive measures being taken by flag state and port state
control.

The reality is that the previous economic advantages gained by non-

compliance are fast disappearing32, as exemplified in the following hypothetical
scenario, where an owner operating a substandard ship manages to get it flagged,
classified, and has secure cargo and insurance. The ship then becomes vulnerable to

32

By avoiding international standards, substandard shipping operators can gain a 15-16% cost
advantage over their competitors (Morris, 2002).
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various pitfalls, which will have serious legal implications, both from regulatory and
civil liability perspectives: it may be involved in an accident such as a collision,
grounding or an oil spill. It may be detained under PSC or blacklisted by labour
unions, or boycotted by stevedores in a port. It may even be refused entry into a
port, having appeared on a list of substandard ships. All these eventualities may
spell financial disaster for the ship-owner (Mukherjee, 2000).
There are many owners that are members of international associations like Intertanko
and Intercargo that are committed to quality shipping, and have taken affirmative
action through these organisations to give this effect. In fact some had management
policies and systems in place long before the International Safety Management (ISM)
Code33 came into being. It is also clear that it is possible for high quality owners, for
whatever reasons they might have for their choice, to regard the flag as a
convenience or legal necessity, and operate to their own high standards (Grey, 2002).
4.7

The Major Stakeholders in Focus

The emphasis placed on PSC could give the impression that the regulatory regime is
all about chasing villains (Stopford, 422). However, PSC provides a defensive
action, which would be redundant if the offensive actions of flag control,
complemented by the action of ship-owners, were effective. However, even if the
system becomes ideally efficient, PSC would still be necessary to serve as a
deterrent, should either flag states or ship-owners become complacent and relax
international standards.
It is clear that the inability of flag, port and coastal states to hold the beneficial
owners of substandard ships culpable, and impose heavy financially and penal
sanctions, has added to the complexity of the problem. However, there is hope in the
ISM Code as it effectively presents the first licensing scheme without which shipping
33

The ISM Code puts more responsibility on the ship-owner to provide effective, proper and safe
management and operation of ships, and for pollution prevention.
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companies and their ships will no longer be able to operate (Branch, 1998, p. 260).
Nevertheless, a cause for concern is that the existing implementation problems with
flag state control can undermine the effectiveness of the objectives of the ISM Code.
The regulatory regime can be far more efficient and effective, but it requires more
cooperation among the major stakeholders, which is predicated on a high level of
transparency34. Transparency is about the group tasked with the responsibly of
regulating and enforcing international standards making available all pertinent
information on a particular ship so that any one member of that group can use the
information to develop an accurate profile on a particular ship or the performance of
the other members of the group35. In essence, transparency provides a means of
checks and balances, and forms the backbone of quality shipping.
The contention is that through effective co-operation, grounded on transparency,
these pillars can be strong enough to ensure that quality shipping is truly viable.
Addressing the existing weaknesses will take time, but there is another front that can
be widened in the attack on substandard shipping, which will not only guarantee
short term success, but will also complement the regulatory regime, through a system
of self regulation.
This second front involves the minor stakeholders, which in the context of the
building, will help to buttress the roof, which is quality shipping. This cannot be
done in isolation, but like the pillars of a very strong and structurally sound house,
they must be strategically placed, thereby exemplifying the need for effective cooperation and coordination between the market forces and the regulatory forces.

34

Transparency will be discussed in more detail in a later chapter as it affects the entire shipping
industry.

35

It is recognise that Classification Societies also provide vital information on ships through their own
regulatory system that is commercially oriented, and necessary for this group. This is examined in a
later chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
THE INTEREST AND ROLE OF THE MINOR STAKEHOLDERS

5.1

The Market Players

Ship operations provide the engine for the shipping market and involve the input and
interaction of key players like classification societies, insurance companies, the
financiers, charterers, and shippers; all considered as equal stakeholders from a
commercial point of view. Subjected to the regulatory regime of the national and
international commercial law, they participate in the market for the sole purpose of
making a profit. Except for the classification society, which has a unique role, they
have no direct role in regulating the safe operation of ships and the protection of the
environment.

However, the symbiotic relationship with the vessel’s operation,

affords them the privilege of influencing maritime safety, which they should consider
an ethical responsibility in so doing proactively.
5.2

Maritime Safety: The Ethical Responsibility

Ethics is about the conviction of doing what is right and making a duty out of its
pursuit (Hinman, 2002). This duty may be determined by one’s professional or
social role36, but it is the act of reasoning, doing what any rational agent should do,
that is the most applicable for minor stakeholders to assimilate in addressing
maritime safety issues.

As a party to the contract of carriage, cargo owners,

charterers, and insurers should be concerned with the safety of the ship since in the
commercial contract entered into, the ship-owner gives the undertaking to provide a
safe vehicle of carriage, normally couched in the form of an implied warranty of
seaworthiness. However, the word “seaworthy” is used in relation with commercial
undertakings, whereas the wider notion of “safety” is applied in maritime penal law
(Hodges, 1999, p.64).
36

The professional role is like a physician’s duty to care for the sick, while the social role is like a
parents’ duty to care for his or her children.
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The hybrid model37, shown in Appendix 8, explains how causalties in transportation
are caused. The system is based on the discovery that accidents are not usually
caused by the mistakes of the frontline operators alone; very often persons not
directly involved, such as management, also contribute to an accident.

This is

possible because a unique combination of latent and active failures creates the
environment for an accident (Schröder, 2003, pp.9-11). It therefore stands to reason
that since the relationship between minor stakeholders and ship’s management is
symbiotic in nature, then by extension any latent failures that exist in these
organisations when combined with latent failures in management, could help to
create the environment for an accident.
The aforementioned argues well for an ethical stand against substandard shipping;
but this is underscored by the fact that most accidents at sea may result in serious
loss of life and property; causing severe pollution of large areas of the sea and
coastlines, with disastrous effects on marine life, local fishing industry, and coastal
amenities (Jensen, 1999). The fact is that all voyages are, and should be seen to be
joint ventures for all the stakeholders involved.
5.3

The Interest and Role of Classification Societies

Classification societies were established at the beginning of the 18th century to meet
the needs of the hull and cargo underwriters who were deprived of any reliable data
on which to base their premiums. By the second half of the 19th century, the
societies were very successful in supplying all the basic information on ships needing
insurance, bringing appreciable economic benefits to marine insurers now able to
bring the risks under control (Boisson, 1999). Today, classification has evolved to
represent the process through which the principal standards for constructing ships
and their essential engineering systems are developed.

Compliance with these

standards is certified through design appraisal, and surveys during construction and

37

The hybrid model was introduced by James Reason in 1990, and is used by the IMO Code for
marine casualty investigation to determine the occurrence sequence of an accident (Schröder, 2003).
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periodically throughout a ship’s life38 (Bradley, 2000). A society therefore has
complete records of all ships classed with it, and because the vessels are
multinational, the data are extremely valuable.
Classification is really about protecting the ship as a piece of property, consequently
it has become a very important tool in the marine industry: All ships must be classed,
and so maintained, to ensure the validity of marine insurance policies; anyone about
to charter a vessel would insist that it be in full classification; a shipper would want
to be assured that the ship transporting his goods is classed; and, in case of a sale, the
prospective buyer would want to know that the ship is classed without any
outstanding recommendations against it (Young, 1982).

Classification therefore

provides a mechanism for self-regulation39 of the marine industry by the key market
players, the minor stakeholders.
The technical skills possessed by the classification societies, and their international
network of surveyors have led to the performance of statutory certification services
on behalf of many governments. Flag states, particularly open registries, delegate
such powers as a means of coping with the complexities of inspections associated
with the regulations contained in the many conventions on safety and the protection
of the environment (Boisson, 1999). This puts classification societies in the unique
position of playing a vital role under the regulatory regime, as they are now agents of
the regime’s principal pillar.
In 1950 fewer that ten clearly identified societies were engaged in classification.
Today there are more than fifty, many of whom do not meet the minimum conditions
for performing their role properly (Boisson, 1999). In addition, most are profitmaking organisations, operating in a billion dollar market, where they derive income

38

Because of this explicit and direct role in approving ship design Ship Builders were not considered
as minor stakeholders. Clearly they come under the direct influence of class, but it is important to
note that a ship that is poorly built will be difficult to maintain at the highest standard.

39

The concept of self-regulation will be discussed in the next chapter.
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by assessing fees for their services. They range from the smallest, employing only a
few surveyors concentrated in determined geographical regions, to the largest, with a
network of surveyors extending over all five continents. Recognising the high level
of inconsistency in applying safety standards, the largest societies have joined forces
in the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS), in an effort to
regulate the procedures for classification.
5.3.1

Focus on Classification Societies.

It is clear that classification societies play a key role in the elimination of
substandard ships, but the competitive climate of operation, allied to the overall lack
of cohesion, except for the IACS members to some extent, often questions the
credibility of their performance. It is not so much possible loopholes in classification
rules that are in question, but it is the way these rules are being applied (Boisson,
1999, p. 421).
Societies today solicit business from ship-owners, representing a dramatic shift from
the previous state of affairs where they acted on behalf of insurers. In addition, when
acting on behalf of the flag states, it is the ship-owners that also pay. This has
created the potential for a conflict of interest, where a society that is rigid about
standards may lose a ship-owner to another society that is willing to compromise
standards. Threatened with the ship-owners freedom to change class at will, many
societies do indulge in the dangerous act of flexibility in the interpretation and
application of rules40 (Boisson, 1999). This is done primarily to retain ships of
dubious quality, but has the overall effect of creating an environment for substandard
shipping41. However, quality societies, particularly IACS members, have established
a “Transfer of Class Agreement” to discourage such “class hopping”.

40

Indulgence was shown in granting term extensions, and where dry-docking surveys were postponed
without real justification (Boisson, 1999, p. 421).
41

Under the Paris MOU alone in 2002, classification societies were held responsible in 312 cases for
class related detainable deficiencies, which is 20% of the total 1,577 detentions (Paris MOU, 2002)
This clearly supports this argument.
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One of the solutions posited is that class surveys and statutory surveys should not be
undertaken by the same society on the same ship, or surveys carried out by one
society be attended by another society (Bradley, 2000). However, the class societies
argue that such an approach offers little benefit and creates a more cumbersome and
costly system of certification; which also from a practical perspective, means
increased work load and pressure on finite technical resources, leading to
inefficiency and greater scope for conflict and abuse.
All these concerns and arguments really put the spotlight on the character and
integrity of the surveyors, for just like a PSC inspector their appraisals validate the
standard of a ship. It is recognised that external pressures, such as commercial,
financial, and time available to conduct the surveys42, may bias the decision and
action taken by a surveyor (Bradley, 2000). Again IACS has taken the lead to allay
these fears by including ethical behaviour within the scope of its programme of
quality audits43, to the extent that it can be detected. Impartial behaviour is also
reinforced by the obligation of each member society to respect the IACS Code of
ethics.
There have been calls also for societies to sever all contact with flags having the
worst PSC records for vessel deficiencies in an effort to get them to be more
responsible. However, this argument according to Bradley (2000) is illogical, since
there is no sense in denying technical support and assistance to those flag states in
greatest need of help or to the many quality ship-owners who decide to register their
ships with a flag having a relatively poor PSC record. However, according to J-Å
Jönsson (Personal interview, 11 July, 2003), there is a certain level of hypocrisy to
this issue, in that since flags delegate these duties, then it is the efficiency and

42

One would expect that a ship ten times as large, would spend ten times as long in the dry dock or
ten times the surveyors to inspect it. In reality, it is the same number of surveyors doing as much in
the same time lest the days off hire are too much to stomach for the owners (Grey, 2003).
43

All IACS auditors, who are independent from member societies, frequently accompany surveyors
so as to ensure conformity with IACS quality and ethical standards (Bradley, 2000)
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effectiveness of class in their execution of these duties that ultimately reflect on the
credibility and performance of the flag states44.
IACS has taken other initiatives that include the automatic suspension of class for
delayed response to class requirements, and broadening the scope of classification
and statutory works to include concerns for the human element in shipping (Payer,
1999).

The efforts of IACS and its members are both appropriate and highly

commendable45, but while IACS may be influential and relatively powerful, these
only represent a fraction of the total number of class societies, some of which have
diverse rules and ethical standards to those championed by IACS. This lack of
solidarity clearly leaves room for substandard shipping to operate, and the very
stringent rules for membership and associate membership to IACS raises questions as
to the possibility of ever bridging this divide. The situation is further complicated
when IACS members compete with each other for a share of the market, and there
are probing questions about cohesion and credibility when there are internal
squabbles among its members. One such dispute concerns the secrecy of a group of
three members that had a go-it-alone approach concerning new rules aimed at
improving fatigue, corrosion and coating, which resulted in charges that they were
looking to gain a commercial advantage through the new rules (McLaughling,
2003b).
5.4

Marine Insurance

Marine insurance generally applies to the ship and its operation, along with the risks
associated with the transportation of goods by sea, and consists of three basic types
(Encarta 2000):
1. Hull and Machinery Insurance (H&M): affords protection to owners of
all types of ships for loss or damage to their water borne property;
44

The present state of affairs could very well be a refection of classification societies applying
different standards depending on the flag state concern (J-Å. Jönsson, personal interview, 2003).
45

IACS points out that the societies “are in the business of securing the safety of life and property at
sea, and the natural environment”, and are organised managed and audited “with this purpose as their
chartered goal” (Grey, 2003)
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2. Cargo Insurance: usually covers the movement of goods by ship from
“warehouse to warehouse”, and therefore includes exposure to those risks
that are associated with land transportation as well; and
3. Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Insurance: protects the vessel owners
against their liability for damage to cargo in their care and custody; death
or injury to passengers, crew, cargo loaders, and others; damage caused to
piers, docks, underwater cables, and bridges; and damage caused by
pollution.
The history of marine insurance closely parallels that of merchant shipping, and were
it not for the insurance coverage against the perils of the sea in the early days, many
more ship-owners and shipping companies would have gone bankrupt than actually
did (Young, 1982, p. 15). Ship-owners also had to contend with pirates, privateers,
and enemy warships that also threatened the safety and security of the ship, its crew,
passengers, and cargo.
Most of the major insurance companies, for example Lloyds of London, are not
single insurance companies but a syndicate of individual underwriters46 and
insurance companies, whose strength lies in its ability to spread the risk (Young,
1982).

Post WW II saw many developing states passing laws to facilitate the

insurance of their own ships, however, in order to cope with the risk of major losses,
most of the business was still rewritten in London or New York.
H&M insurance is a profit making business, while P&I insurance is mutuality that
exists not for profit, but for the mutual benefit of all its members, therefore members
bear the losses jointly. The P&I Clubs provide the widest third-party liability cover
available for ship operators, where the cover is without financial limit, except for oil
pollution (Bull, 1999). The premium paid by the ship-owner for both P&I and H&M
coverage comes with a “deductible clause”, where the first layer on every claim or
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The term “underwriter” came about when a syndicate member, having agreed to take a certain
percentage of the risk of another member’s client, would sign at the bottom of the page under the
terms of the contract (Young, 1982, p.16).
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voyage is deducted before an eventual recovery from the underwriters (Luddeke,
1999).
In addition, whatever is paid out in claims and reimbursed by the P&I underwriter is
counted against the record and the statistical performance. For an owner it is critical
not to have a loss record of more that 70%, since when it is time to renew the
coverage, a loss record of over 70% will attract an increase premium adjusted for
inflation and general increase for the record of the Club; whereas a loss record of
70% or lower stands a reasonable chance of the rate remaining as is, or lowered, or in
exceptional cases, a refund of the premium (Luddeke, 1999). This in theory provides
for a means of self-regulation of this segment of the industry.
There are other methods employed to discourage negligence among ship-owners: the
largest clubs having set up their own inspection system in order to establish the real
level of quality of the ships they insure; whilst both the clubs and H&M insurers
have been increasingly using the classification clauses in insurance policies, which
allows direct access to the records of the society that classes a particular ship; the
hull and cargo insurers have also attempted to differentiate premiums on the basis of
an overall quality assessment of a ship-owners fleet: but most important is the
“reinforcement of surveys and inspections”47, which has shown positive signs where
nearly 80% of these surveys have led to major repairs (Boisson, 1999).
It is ironic that despite ship-owners’ cognizance of the fact that the cost of accidents
will of necessity increase insurance premiums, and thus the ship’s operating costs,
which will ultimately affect the viability of their business, they still continue to
operate sub-standard ships. This supports the notion that not too much care is really
necessary, as owners will not suffer unduly because they are insured (Ludekke,
1999).
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The reinforced surveys and inspections was introduced in 1993 and included as a “Structural
Condition Warranty” in the British hull policies. It forces ship-owners to have their ships inspected
by the Salvage Association, which provides technical advice to the London insurance world, and
discloses the reports and recommendations to the insurance company (Boisson, 1999).
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5.4.1

Focus on Marine Insurers

The prevailing view is that underwriters are in a privileged position to take decisive
measures to eliminate substandard ships: a ship cannot sail, enter a port or raise a
loan unless it is insured. However, it is the short-term commercial considerations
that often prevail over long-term goals for quality shipping, creating deficiencies that
facilitate sub-standard shipping (Boisson, 1999).
The H&M insurance market has been tough over the last decade with rates hitting
rock bottom because of over-capacity and fierce competition, which has transformed
it into a cost-driven market, where proper risk assessment48 is neglected for fear of
losing business (Nieuwpoort, 2000).

Without proper risk assessment and price

differentiation the insurers are invariably providing incentives to substandard
shipping: reinsurance or higher deductibles or spreading the risk through syndication,
will only conceal the problem. It gets more complicated when the insurers are not
able to systematically include the classification clause in all contracts that would
provide more transparency by allowing access to the records of classed ships
(Boisson, 1999). Certain hull insurers have even admitted that they earned far less
by insuring good operators than bad ones, for whom competition was less, and
premiums higher49 (Herlofson, 1993).
The P&I Clubs have also been subjected to commercial pressures from ship-owners
seeking undemanding insurers. However, what is of concern is the reluctance to
exclude bad clients, which illustrates the contradiction that exists between the
political will displayed by ship-owners on the boards of such clubs and the standards
their employees apply in reality or try to have respected (Boisson, 1999). What is
encouraging is that clubs now realise that amassing more tonnage brings with it
increased risk, so unless new members have good records, growth is perilous (Insight
& Opinion, 2003). Just as inciting is the new international hull clauses introduced by
48

Risk assessment means a systematic approach to evaluating and measuring each client against
defined quality standards (Nieuwpoort, 2000).
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A summary presented by Boisson, (1999, p. 422).
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underwriters in November 2002, which effectively deny coverage to any vessel that
does not comply with the ISM Code (Paying the price, 2002/2000).
5.5

Charterers and Shippers

It is the demand for shipping, created by charterers and shippers, which stimulates
ship-owners to supply the vessels to the market. The activities and role of brokers50
acting on behalf of either party is recognised, but their purview is purely
transactional; therefore the ultimate responsibility of any perceived influence on their
part in the market, lies with the party they represent.
There are a number of circumstances under which ships are chartered; some of these
are: by cargo merchants with grain, oil, etc, requiring vessel for a single voyage; by
fleet operators wishing to cover additional needs of peak seasonal activities; by an
operator wishing to launch a new service with chartered tonnage; to cover a survey
period or during an accident situation; as part of a strategy to operate a business with
chartered tonnage or a mixture of chartered tonnage and outright ownership; by a
marketing board for cotton, fruits, etc, for the carriage of seasonal crops; and by a
company engaged in the oil, chemical or gas industries (Branch, 1998, p. 212).
There are several types of charters commercially available that a charterer will utilise
depending on the particular need51, these are (Australian Parliament, 1992):
1. Bare Boat Charter: where the charterer has the use of the vessel for a set
period of time, usually a number of years, for an agreed price. During
this time the charterer is responsible for the operation of the ship, crewing
and insurance;
2. Time charter: where the vessel is chartered for a specific period of time;
which can be short-term, generally for less that a year, or long-term,
50

The focus here is on the chartering brokers. Shippers and charters usually use their own brokers.
The owner’s broker represents the interest of the owner by trying to get the highest possible freight
rates or hire, and the best possible contract conditions; while the charter’s broker is trying to do the
opposite in the interest of the charters (Ma, 2002, p. 61).
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The terms will be spelt out in a Charter-Party Agreement.
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which may run from one to twenty years. Under this system the operation
of the ship may be the responsibility of either the owner/operator or the
charterer depending on the terms of the agreement;
3. A single voyage charter or spot charter: where a vessel is chartered for a
specific voyage. Under this system the owner/operator is responsible for
the ship’s operation, while the master remains under an obligation to
undertake the voyage as the chaterer instructs. The freight rate for voyage
charter are usually higher that the other types of charter.
5.5.1

Focus on the Charterers

In the past the general view of the charterers was that the condition of ships were
deemed satisfactory, if they were offered on the market with valid certificates, as
required under all applicable international conventions (Australian Parliament, 1992,
p.21). Over time this presumption had been increasingly questioned, therefore some
charterers have been taking steps to independently confirm that ships considered for
charter are in a satisfactory condition.

However, what is very clear is that

substandard ships can only stay in business because there is a charterer willing to
employ them (Paniguian, 1999).
The general view is that shippers are convinced that one must not pay more than is
necessary to transport goods, which has raised several voices against the
irresponsible practices of certain shippers using old or substandard ships in order to
boost their profits (Boisson, 1999). However, this insatiable appetite for cheap rates
will have to be curbed because of the increased security implication of such rates, as
exemplified by the recent case where a Lebanese gang hijacked a ship and earned
millions by offering cheap rates (Gang making millions…, 2003). To be fair to this
segment of the industry, it is recognised that shippers really consist of a mixed bag.
There are those with a general apathy towards maritime safety, which will go as far
as to manipulate the market by taking maximum advantage of the benefits arising
from available tonnage, in order to force freight rates down (Boisson, 1999); whilst
others show little interest in participating in the industry’s affairs, giving the
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impression that they are only concerned when cargo is lost or damaged, or even have
no interest at all: after all, the insurance will pay! (Farthing & Brownrigg, 1997
On the other hand there are charterers that have taken reasonable steps towards
eliminating poor quality vessels, even with the general problem of insufficient
information about the quality of the ships available for charter. These are primarily
the large charterers, principally but not exclusively the oil majors. They recognise
that a major oil spill will not only damage the environment, but can also impair their
public image as well as spell financial disaster. Some of the steps taken include
(Boisson, 1999):
1

Revision of Charter Parties: where an environmental protection clause
has been included in most charter-parties involving oil transportation.
This translates to the owners having to meet imposed requirements
regarding the age of their ships and their safety management systems

2

Vetting: several procedures have been introduced, including a risk
analysis method, physical inspection of ships, and shipping company
audits. For example, Elf inspects 800 to 1000 ships every year. In order
to discourage the disparities in the quality of inspection, the Oil
Companies International Maritime Forum (OCIMF)52 has issued
standardised inspection procedures to its members.

3

Development of database: In 1993 OCIMF established the Ship
Inspection Report Exchange programme (SIRE), a databank strictly
reserved for its members. It is used to centralise information collected
separately by each member, and serves to limit duplication of inspection
and improve the objectivity of the survey reports, and to make oil tankers
safer by tracking down substandard shipping. The Chemical Distribution
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The OCIMF was formed in 1970 at a meeting of some 18 oil majors in London as a response in part
to public concern about oil pollution following the Torrey Canyon, and to have representation to
governments and intergovernmental bodies. It has a membership of some 40 oil companies with the
primary objective of promoting and maintaining safety standards in all aspect on the ships operation,
and the protection of the environment from pollution (Farthing & Brownrigg, 1997, p. 52).
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Institute (CDI) has taken a similar approach in dealing with the
transportation of noxious or dangerous products.
5.6

The Financiers

The shipping industry is a very capital-intensive industry where capital payments
dominate a ship-owner’s cash flow and important financial decisions53. The history
of ship financing mirrors that of the history and evolution of ship ownership
structures. As the world economy grew in the 1950s and 1960s there was a long
phase of charter-backed financing: with the rapid growth of the industrial economies
in Europe and Japan, industrial shippers seeking new and cheaper raw material
sources overseas would offer long time charters as an incentive, which the owner
would use as cash-flow collateral for a loan to buy the ship. This was followed by
new forms of asset-backed finance during the very volatile markets of the 1980s:
here the shipping market cycle bottomed out in the mid-1980s, the distressed sales
created opportunities for “asset play”, that is buying ships cheaply and selling them
at a higher price. Financing in the 1990s shifted to public offerings and corporate
lending as shipping companies shifted to corporate ownership structures (Stopford,
2000).
Equity, debt, mezzanine financing, and leasing are the four different financial
structures that can be adopted to finance shipping; with the money coming from three
markets, the money market (short-term debt), the capital market (long-term debt),
and the stock market (equity). With equity, the company seeks investors who will
take a stake in the company, sharing the risk and receiving the rewards. Debt
financing is basically a loan of some form, which is attractive to borrowers because it
is a flexible way of financing a shipping company, while retaining full ownership of
the business. When there is a combination of equity and debt financing it is called a
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A container ship or a tanker can cost up to $125 million each, while most LNG tankers will go up
to $250 million each. The tankers carrying the oil imported to the United States alone have a
replacement cost of $150 billion. In the early 1990s the bulk shipping industry alone invested about
$20 billion each year on new and second-hand ships (Stopford, 2000, p. 194).
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mezzanine. Finally there is lease financing with its basic principle borrowed from
the property business, in that the owner of the ship (the lessor: a ship yard, etc) hands
it over to the lessee who, in return for a rental stream, is free to operate it as if it was
his own: at the end of the lease the ship reverts to the lessor (Stopford, 2000).
Appendix 9 shows the various financing categories along with a breakdown of the
various types of finance with their typical features.
5.6.1

Focus on the Financiers

Debt is the most widely used form of ship financing today, which is available in
several forms as shown in Appendix 9, but it is bank loans that are by far the most
popular. Bank loans are granted by a number of different financial institutions such
as: export-import banks; development banks; banks specialising in shipping; and
commercial banks. These institutions deal primarily with one major risk, that is
“credit risk” or “default risk”, which is the uncertainty over the repayment of the
general loan and payment of interest in full on the promised date (Grammenos,
2002). It is primarily the manner in which these risks are managed that gives banks
the greatest potential to have a powerful influence on the safety of ships in general
and the operation of substandard ships in particular.
Default risk is created primarily due to the volatility of the vessel’s income, which is
the main source of the loan repayment; and in most cases, the main security for the
loan. To control this risk the banks in principle employ a comprehensive credit
policy and credit risk analysis on the prospective borrower. These can be supported
by other means of strengthening the soundness of the loans such as: securities, which
are dominated by mortgages, and include cash flow and financial guarantees; then
there are covenants54, which translate to banking vigilance through the monitoring,
where information regarding a particular loan is collected, processed and analysed,
including annual and possible semi-annual loan reviews (Grammenos, 2002). In
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Covenants are contractual obligations of the borrower to the lender, which are included in the loan
agreement and those referring to the vessel in the mortgage, and refer to certain actions that the
borrower should and should not undertake.
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addition, insurance coverage is required as an additional security should the vessel be
damaged, lost, or subjected to claims from third parties.
There is no doubt that ships operated in a substandard manner are most likely to
create circumstances that will cause the default risk to increase dramatically; but
despite the arsenal available to bankers to control this likely phenomenon,
substandard ships are still able to get and maintain finance. One recognises that the
banking sector is very competitive, with shipping loans forming a substantial part of
the banks revenue, but with the volatility of the market coupled with the clear and
present danger of substandard shipping, it is hard to fathom why the elaborate
measures that are in place are not having the desired effects. One possible solution is
to include a safety clause in the covenant, because in the final analysis, it is the banks
that are likely to lose.
5.7

The Concept of Self-Regulation

The market players, except for the ship-owners, exist outside the governmental
regulatory regime concerning maritime safety, consequently self-regulation describes
measures taken by the industry to proactively shape the safety aspect of the
environment in which they operate55.

According to Sommerville (1999), self-

regulation is a way for the market players to participate in setting and enforcing
practical, achievable and desirable standards for safety…it will demonstrate to
regulators that they have embraced a safety culture with identifiable results…and
serves as a means of curtailing further well intentioned but imperfectly realized kneejerk legislative responses to the inevitable incidents of the future.
The concept of self-regulation is nothing new, in fact the mechanisms already exist
in the industry: classification is the oldest and most widely recognised form; within
the insurance sector, premium differentials also serve this purpose; for the shipowner the recently introduce ISM Code was specifically tailored with this intent;
55

Self-regulation can also be achieved through, for example, codes of conduct, codes of best
practices, and toal quality management (Nieuwpoort, 1999).
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finally, the credit risk analysis employed by the banks can also serve as a means of
self-regulation. Clearly what is needed is the conviction and willingness to embrace
the concept fully.
Whilst most welcome, the renewed thrust towards self-regulation as a complement to
the traditional compliance and survey-based system to ensure maritime safety, it is
seen by some as a replacement. Self-regulation as a replacement rather than a
complement represents an extreme condition that would drastically change current
working practice in the industry. For example, class would no longer be the leading
provider of third party inspections, although its core functions would remain, as the
onus would now be on companies to schedule inspection and ensure regular
performance. This would translate to an increased role for PSC and societies to
provide independent spot checks (Prayer, 1999). This extreme would obviously
create chaos and give substandard operators the freedom to devise ingenious means
to subvert the core principles of quality shipping, considering the existing inherent
weaknesses of the major stakeholders.

Clearly, what is needed is synergy and

harmony between the regulatory regime and self-regulation of the industry.
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CHAPTER 6
THE REALITIES AND PERFORMANCE OF THE MINOR
STAKEHOLDERS
6.1

Minor Stakeholders and Sub-Standard Shipping

The connection between substandard shipping and the major stakeholders has
already been established. This therefore leads to one very pertinent question: are
brokers, shippers, insurers, classification societies and bankers oblivious of the fact
that they are colluding in the employment of a substandard ship? In many cases
substandard shipping is facilitated by the unwillingness of some of the minor
stakeholders to take meaningful counter-actions. They are driven by the lure of
cheapness and the fight for market share to employ, insure, and finance vessels of
poor quality (Netelenbos, 1999). They know that when a vessel is detained under
PSC, it is the owner that suffers, they suffer no penalty: the vessel’s cargo will be
discharged and no action will be taken against the charterer, the insurer or any other
user of the vessel. The reality is that substandard shipping is unfair competition and
catastrophic in the long run. It harms the interest of respectable parties in the
shipping trade, it endangers the lives and well-being of ship crews, and threatens the
marine environment (Netelenbos, 2000).
6.2

Quality Shipping

It is generally understood that maritime transportation is definitely not risk free. It is
not possible to mandate an error-free operating environment or an unsinkable ship.
There will always be a degree of risk associated with navigating the uncertain and
often turbulent waters of the world ‘s oceans (Iarossi, 2003). Despite this inherent
risk, it is possible to minimise the likelihood of a catastrophe with the universal
employment of the concept of quality shipping.
There has been much discussion as to the true definition of quality shipping, but the
most widely accepted is: shipping that is in accordance with the applicable
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international standards of the day, as well as any related or additional standards set
and adopted by others (Winbow, 2002). It therefore embraces the wider notion that
all the stakeholders, both major and minor, must perform at the highest level,
whether based on the explicit responsibility under the regulatory regime or from an
economic perspective, with an ethical conviction.
The question of how to achieve quality shipping on a global level is not new, nor is it
an easy one to address. It involves not just technical and operational issues, but also
political and economical considerations (Cheow Tong, 2000).

Quality shipping

therefore requires a very efficient regulatory regime that serves the interest of all
stakeholders in the shipping industry, which is best achieved by having an
amalgamation of the regulatory regime and the concept of self-regulation, creating a
mezzanine regulatory regime. However, the success of the regime is only possible if
there is a safety culture that permeates the entire industry, requiring a shift from the
present multi-culture, characterized by secrecy, blame, compliance, and evasion. All
this in turn translates to a harmonized global approach that will close the dragnet on
substandard shipping. Unilateral and regional measures will only be detrimental to
the quality shipping campaign (Lyras, 2000).
The required paradigm shift will have to be predicated on transparency and will
require incentives to jump-start the process. This new paradigm is highly desirable
as a means of ensuring greater accountability and credibility, considering the current
status quo of complex ownership, management and operation. Take for example the
1976-built obo Cerda56: it flies the Liberain flag and is classed with Italy’s Rina with
its ISM certification issued by DNV.

The vessel is managed by Swiss-based

Acomarit, is owned by CTGM (Compagnie pour le Transport et Gestion Maritimes),
a Swiss based, but very Italian operation, forming part of the Euroceanca group
(Tankers in the spotlight, 2000)
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The UK’s Maritime and Coastguard Authority detained the Cedra under PSC with 26 hardware
deficiencies on a voyage charter delivering 80,000 tons of jet fuel (Tankers in the spotlight, 2000).
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6.3

The Safety Culture

The Encarta dictionary describes safety as the condition of being safe; freedom from
danger, risk, or injury, whilst culture is defined as the totality of socially transmitted
behavior patterns, beliefs, institutions, and all other products of human work and
thought. It is therefore appropriate to describe safety culture as that behavior pattern
and belief adopted by an individual or institution that will safeguard against danger,
risk or injury, in their work pursuits. Commitment, style, and proficiency are the
qualities at the heart of a safety culture (IMO, 2002).
There is no reason why the safety culture should not become the mantra for all the
stakeholders in the shipping industry since a catalytic structure already exist. This
structure is provided by: the ISM Code; the improved International Convention on
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) 1978;
the FSA; PSC; and the increased emphasis on the human element (O’Neil, 1999).
O’Neil, (1999) also echoes the general sentiments of the industry when he says, “ the
culture of secrecy which has characterized shipping for centuries needs to be
consigned to history… in its place we should foster a culture of safety and
environmental conscience which makes sure nothing is introduced into shipping until
we are certain that it is safe and environmentally sound”.
The existing multi-cultural industry lacks the sense of collective responsibility and is
without proper and effective checks and balances: features indicative of a market that
is cost-driven instead of quality driven, which without a safety culture will make it
increasingly difficult to effectively enforce existing and new regulations
(Nieuwpoort, 1999). In addition, for it to be effective, it must progress beyond
merely following externally imposed rules, emphasizing the need for every company
and individual within the industry to be responsible for taking appropriate action to
constantly improve safety. The task of changing the culture is enormous and the
only stimuli that the majority of the stakeholders respond to readily are those that are
financial in nature, consequently it will require attractive incentives to defeat the
inertia and propel the new paradigm of a safety culture forward.
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6.3.1

Incentives

It is the general consensus that the vast majority of stakeholders are responsible
people doing a great job, applying high standards, improving their economic
performance with an integrated concept for safety and care for the environment.
However, the said majority are forced to bear much of the exasperating regulatory
and inspection burden that are imposed because of the minority (Payer, 2000). This
has spawned a recurring call for the development of incentives that will reward the
best operators and encourage others to emulate them (Grey, 2000).

Incentives

therefore broadly provide a framework that employs market and regulatory
mechanisms to bring about a reversal in the status quo making quality shipping,
rather than substandard shipping, profitable.
Some of the major stakeholders, under the regulatory regime, have already taken the
initiative to create an incentive scheme. The US Coast Guard (USCG) for example,
has implemented the Qualship 21 program, which is a procedure to identify and
reward foreign flag quality ships, and provide them with incentives to become and
remain quality vessels. The performance criteria are based on: a lack of detentions
for the owner over a specified period; the ship not being classed with a targeted
society and not registered with a flag that has a high detention ratio; as well as a good
performance history and degree of transparency of the flag state (Qualship 21, 2003).
This results in a reduction of inspections for qualifying vessels, which facilitates
better utilisation of resources and enhancement of the targeting system.
The present prescriptive regulatory regime generally, however, does not provide the
kind of tangible economic incentives that are likely to have the desired dramatic
effect on complying with the rules; consequently it is the minor stakeholders that will
have to bear the responsibility of providing these stimuli. Many believe that selfregulation provides such a stimulant (Payer, 2000), but other stimuli have to be
realistic and can take the form of, but not limited to; insurance coverage at lower
rates, more and cheaper financing, and higher chartering rates (Lyras, 2000). All
these are feasible because quality ships translate into lower risk and less liability. In
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the past many of the minor stakeholders, particularly the insurance companies, have
argued that their market did not provide for such discrimination, which was
compounded by the prevalence of the culture of secrecy and evasion (Grey, 2000).
However, the present trend towards greater transparency supported by the advent of
the EQUASIS57 database will abate existing deficiencies if utilised properly as a
modern tool for the assessment of risk58, making it possible for the creation of
realistic incentives.
The general view was that a freedom from regulatory scrutiny represents one of the
practical incentives that would be appreciated by the best owners (Grey, 2000), but
this has been countered by the very manner in which the incentive scheme is
employed, that of a carrot and stick system, which clearly connotes an incentive
scheme, the carrot, in harmony with a very potent accessible regulatory regime,
representing the stick.
6.3.2

Transparency

Transparency in the maritime industry is about the availability in the public domain
of all pertinent data concerning all ships, their ownership, operation, and the nature
of their interaction and business transaction with all stakeholders in the industry.
This information must not only be available, but should be easily accessible by all
stakeholders to be used to enhance the concept of quality shipping.
Several stakeholders have already taken steps to make transparency a reality. These
include such efforts as:
1. Some PSC organisations and MOUs now publish lists of ships that have
been detained, complete with details of flag, classification society and
owner (Mitropolous, 1999).
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The EQUASIS database is defined and examined later in this chapter.
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Risk assessment means a systematic approach to evaluating each client against defined quality
standards (Nieuwpoort, 2000).
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2. The American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), is making available on their
website, for public scrutiny, information on all transfers, withdrawals,
and cancellations (Classification; Its time to…, 2003).
3. IACS is placing information about its technical work programme in the
public domain by publishing it on the Association’s website
(Classification; Class won’t be…, 2003).
4. Lloyd’s Register, through its Class Direct Live, provides its classed
owners with information on ships, shipboard equipment, classification
status, statutory certification status and increasingly ship plans and other
related documents. In addition, it also publishes information on its port
state detention performance on its website (Classification; Class won’t
be…, 2003).
5. DNV, as of February 2003, is making available on its website all
overdue conditions of class or statutory recommendations and overdue
surveys leading to class suspension or withdrawal (Olaisen, 2003).
The information provided has enormous potential: take for example the data on PSC
detentions; because it is updated on a real time basis, specific aspects can be
measured against prior performance. These include the number of PSC detentions,
detention against ship types, detentions related to flag state; detentions by age and
country, and league tables of the most prominent and recurring detention items
(Classification; Class won’t be…2003).
Transparency, therefore, enables stakeholders to determine the pedigree and quality
of a ship, as well as that of its affiliates. This means that stakeholders “can hold
those who employ substandard ships accountable for their actions, as they will no
longer be able to hide behind the cloak of ignorance”(Netelenbos, 1999).

In

addition, stakeholders will be able to better target ships for inspections or other
stakeholders for closer scrutiny, in the quest for quality shipping. To boost the
campaign for greater transparency, a global introduction of a unique numbering
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scheme for the ready identification of ship owning and ship management companies
has been agreed upon in principle by the IMO59 (Lloyds List, 2003).
Many heralded transparency as a panacea to the ills of substandard shipping, but this
must be approached with caution and tempered by the fact that the success of the
system is highly dependent on timely, reliable, accurate, and continuously updated
data.

This is conditional to absolute commitment to the process by all the

stakeholders, which reflects their assimilation of, and commitment to, the new safety
culture, a true chicken and egg dilemma60.

Despite this potential shortcoming,

transparency in its purest form will certainly improve accountability and credibility,
two highly desirable but elusive characteristics, particularly in the aftermath of an
incident.

It will also enhance and add credence towards the concept of self-

regulation and aid in its general acceptance and survival.
6.3.3

The EQUASIS database

The European Quality Shipping Information System (EQUASIS) forms the backbone
of the transparency concept61.

Established in June 2000, it is an international

database covering the world’s merchant fleet, and serves to promote the exchange of
unbiased information and transparency in maritime transport. It therefore allows
persons involved in maritime transport to be better informed about the performance
of the ships and maritime organisations with which they are dealing (Equasis, 2003).
Equasis should also be recognised as a step towards the introduction of the wideranging ship-related information system, which is needed to ensure effective selfregulation by industry players (Doi, 2000).
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This ID Code is expected to have both safety and security benefits, and will become mandatory
through amendments to SOLAS and its inclusion in the ISM Code certificates (Lloyds List, 2003).
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The chicken and egg dilemma refers to the concept of what comes first, the chicken or the egg.
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This represents a joint venture between the European Union, France, the Paris MOU, and the Tokyo
MOU to provide a single source of information on the quality of commercial shipping (North, 2000).
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The bulk of the data available in equasis is generated by PSC inspections around the
world, which is currently being accessed by about 1,500 users a month with 6,000
registered users in total, and data for 60,000 vessels. In an effort to expand the
information available, hyperlinks have been established with four prominent
classification societies62 and there are hopes to include all IACS members in the
future, given their commitment to a policy of greater transparency and
accountability. This will allow a user consulting a specific ship on equasis to access
the class society's website page corresponding to that ship in a single click (Digital
Ship, 2003).

Equasis is a fledgling database that is expecting the input of insurers, private
inspections such as SIRE and CDI, and others in the near future. Despite limited
input sources, it is estimated that the user base is 11% charterers, 10.5% government
administrations, 9% shipmanagers, 7.5% insurers, 7% shipowners, 7% surveyors,
5.5% consultants, 5% classification societies and 4% brokers (Digital Ship, 2003).
Initially there was scepticism about the database, and a reluctance to release data
held confidentially. However, the data is now considered reliable; the acceptance of
equasis by a range of marine organisations, such as the International Chamber of
Shipping, Intertanko, and Intercargo being a clear sign that it is now part of the
maritime landscape (Grey, 2003).
6.4

Mezzanine Regulation

Quality shipping is dependent on a regulatory environment that will stimulate and
sustain all stakeholders in taking action that will make quality shipping an integral
part of their organisations’ ethos. At the Mare Forum Conference (1999), there was
a unanimous agreement among participants representing a wide cross-section of the
industry, that a better balance could be achieved between regulation and selfregulation.

A mezzanine regime would represent a formidable challenge to
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These societies are Lloyd's Register (LR), American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), Class NK (NKK)
and the Korean Register of Shipping (KRS).
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substandard shipping by combining the positive and effective aspects of the
regulatory regime and self-regulation.

The ideal balance is achieved when

companies have enough flexibility and control in all operational aspects within the
limits for safety and environmental protection (Nieuwpoort, 1999).
In a mezzanine regime, over regulation, implementation problems, and the
prescriptive nature of the regulatory regime are tempered by self-regulation that
allows the minor stakeholders to set standards where the regulatory regime is silent,
and ensure that they have the desired impact on the economic factors that create the
climate for substandard ships (Mitropoulos, 2000). In fact, the mezzanine regime
would serve a critical role in creating a redundancy, that is a system of “doublechecks” on each stakeholder, which in effect translates to defence in depth63 against
substandard shipping (Moore, 2000). In effect the mezzanine regime could act as a
force multiplier in the process of eliminating substandard shipping, as through
effective coordination, governments can influence the economic rationality within
the industry.
6.5

The Propeller Principle on Quality Shipping

It is clear that the quest for quality shipping represents a dynamitic process that
requires a synergistic interaction between all the stakeholders in the maritime
industry. It therefore means that quality shipping represents a process and not a
destination. In fact, the day it is perceived and accepted as a destination, is the day
the industry will recede to the old modus operandi, which for substandard shipping
would mean business as usual.
It is the author’s view that a ship’s propeller aptly symbolises the process and
collaboration required to be employed towards quality shipping. Figure 6.1 shows
the propeller principle for quality shipping, which represents a transition from the
current view as illustrated in Figure 2.2. One of the distinct changes that has been
63

Defence in depth means that if something unexpectedly goes wrong, then there are several layers of
defence mechanism that should prevent really bad things from happening (Moore, 2000).
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made is the reclassification of the class societies from being minor stakeholders to
what is now defined as mini-major stakeholders; because of its emerged prominence
as an agent of the regulatory forces whilst maintaining its principal role as a market
player.

Public Opinion
Mini-major
Stakeholders

Major Stakeholders
IMO

Flag

Coastal States
Port States

Non-IACS societies

Ship

IACS Members

Owner

Charterers
Insurers
Financiers

Minor
Stakeholders

Figure 6.1 Wayne Mykoo’s propeller principle model for achieving quality shipping

The propeller principle illustrates that the only way to defeat inertia and give
momentum to the quality shipping process is to have the propeller turning, meaning
that all the stakeholders taking simultaneous action within their domain to enhance
quality shipping. The effectiveness and efficiency of the propeller is dependent on
the balance and pitch of the propeller, meaning that there is optimal cooperation and
coordination between all the stakeholders on each blade respectively. In addition,
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the energy from the shaft is transmitted via the hub, the strength and focus of the
propeller blades, which represent the ship-owner, the ultimate responsibility for a
quality ship. Finally, the progress of quality shipping will depend on the density of
the water that the propeller is operating in, meaning the prevailing public opinion on
the shipping industry.
The propeller principle in essence is a about checks and balances/cooperation and
coordination, necessary for obtaining a better equilibrium between the quest for
profits and continuity by the industry on the one hand, and the necessity to reduce the
social cost of sea transportation on the other (Neiuwpoort, 1999).
6.5.1

Balancing the Blades

For the major stakeholders blade, effective cooperation and coordination between
all the stakeholders is paramount to achieving the desired balance and pitch, but it
must be predicated on the optimal efficiency of every single organisational unit.
This means that all the deficiencies that have been highlighted in the previous
chapters, like flag state implementation problems, will have to be addressed; while
simultaneously pursuing the drive towards global PSC. The recent measures by the
Paris MOU to ban high-risk ships will serve to enhance the balance, especially if
similar policies are adopted by the other MOUs64.
Probably the most effective means of achieving and maintaining balance and pitch
would be to give the IMO enforcement powers. This move is certainly supported by
the incumbent Secretary General of the IMO who remarked that the white list
provisions of STCW pointed the way forward, and that other conventions should
have similar performance benchmarks and sanctions, with penalties available (Osler,
2003b). In the absence of this solution, the recently proposed IMO voluntary model
flag audit scheme, which will be made compatible with a new Code addressing flag,
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Under the banning policy, ships deemed “very high risk” or “high risk” will be banned from all 19member States if they are detained twice in three years. Ships with the lower-risk flags will be banned
if they are detained three times in two years (Osler, 2003a).
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port and coastal state responsibilities, is certainly a step in the right direction (Lloyds
List, 2003).
With the minor stakeholders blade, it recognised that all the stakeholders are linked
together through risk. Consequently, proper balance and pitch is achieved when all
units, through mutual cooperation and coordination, give priority to risk
minimization and safety optimization, as the driving force to improve their
performance and become more efficient, productive and profitable (Papoutsis, 2000).
A basis for such cooperation is already provided by the Maritime Industry Charter65,
which was signed by many parties in 1999 (Netelenbos, 2000). A recent positive
development has been the news that the marine insurance industry representatives are
to work with the OECD on a study of ways insurers can contribute to the elimination
of substandard ships (Spurrier, 2003). This move will undoubtedly contribute to the
balance.
For the mini-major stakeholders, effective harmonisation of classification rules
right across the board is essential in achieving balance and pitch.

With

harmonisation and the eradication of divisive problems between societies, it will be
difficult for shipyards and owners to exploit existing weaknesses to build ships
cheaply, with the chance of having “difficult to maintain ships” from the beginning
(McLauglin, 2003a). The emerging threat of increased liability for class, as evident
in the case where Spain is threatening to sue ABS with respect to damages caused by
the Prestige66, should spur this effort. In addition, because class is funded by shipowners, to remove the stigma surrounding the issue of conflict of interest, other
options for funding will have to be explored in earnest (ten Hoopen, 2000).
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The Charter lays down five basic principles that each signatory should conform to, for example the
first principle states that, “each link in the maritime responsibility chain shall make safety
considerations an integral part of its business transactions” (Boisson, 1999).
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Spain is threatening to sue ABS for $5bn over the Prestige, alleging that the classification society’s
negligence, reckless, wilful and wanton conduct led to the lost of the Prestige and the massive
environmental damage that followed (McLaughlin & Reyes, 2003).
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Balancing the blade will be enhanced by the implementation of the new plan agreed
upon by the members of IACS67, where a team of experts from IACS would visit a
particular administration and draw up a programme of technical assistance designed
to improve performance (Blacked flags…, 2003).

Already there have been

suggestions that the IMO should be the one to set prescriptive structural standards
presently within the remit of class societies, but this would only stifle creativity and
innovation, a role that class performs well.

Others have sought to temper this

position by offering the option that IMO should set the goals and allow class to
devise its own means of achieving these goals (Grey, 2003d).
In reality, what is critical is that class societies should compete on quality, not on
price. The affirmative move by Germanischer Lloyd that threw 245 ships off its
registry last year because of missed surveys or inadequate standards (Classification
society expels…, 2003), will only have a positive influence on balance, if such a
move becomes universal, with other flags suppressing the urge to readily accepting
these declassed vessels without proper remedial action having been taken. It is
encouraging to see other societies like DNV, taking similar action.
6.5.2

The Propeller Blades’ Overlaps

Where the propeller blades overlap at their bases near the hub also bears important
significance. The overlaps of the major stakeholders blade and the two other blades
represents the mezzanine regulatory regime: it is strengthen when governments
refrain from knee-jerk reaction, and all other stakeholders are allowed to implement
systems with the knowledge of the implicated costs, and take steps to cater for this,
in the spirit of the FSA, implemented by the IMO. Focusing on the overlap with the
class blade illustrates the societies’ consultative role in the IMO and flag state
supervision of class; whilst the overlap with the minor stakeholders blade symbolises
the role the industry’s various associations play in the law making process at the
IMO, and the commercial regulations that govern their economic pursuits.
67

A pilot programme has apparently already taken place with encouraging results (Blacked flags...,
2003).
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In addition, the overlap between the mini-major and the minor stakeholders blade
again symbolises the concept of self-regulation. The strength here is based on the
commitment to the fundamental principles that already exist between class and
insurance; where only class can tell the insurance companies the difference between
a ship that barely meets the required standards versus one that far exceeds the
standards; and between insurance and finance, where all should refrain from the
temptation to compromise standards. Even though they compete in their respective
sectors on price it should not be at the expense of safety standards.
6.5.3

The Propeller Hub

The hub of the propeller symbolises the ship-owner as the centre of the quality
shipping campaign. The overall strength and efficiency of the propeller relies on the
level of commitment and compliance to international standards. It is only a minority
of ship-owners that employs evasion tactics to reduce operating costs (de Ruiter,
2000). The epitome of a quality ship-owner is the one who will not only be fully
aware of all the applicable international standards, but will apply these standards, in
addition to any other related standards adopted by others, without being told or
coerced into doing so (Mitropoulos, 2000).
With the hub of the propeller being at the desired strength, and the blades properly
pitched and balanced, then the stage is set for the entire propeller to operate
effectively and efficiently. This will eliminate vibrations and minimize cavitations,
which are both irritants to the general public. It is then possible to achieve a high
level of quality, a high degree of excellence, ensuring safe, secure, competitive, and
environmentally responsible shipping (North, 1999).

The propeller principle

therefore vindicates the hypothesis posed by O’Neil (1999) when he says, “Just as
war is too important to be left to the generals, so shipping safety is too important to
be left to the ship-owners alone, or any other section of the industry”.

72

6.5.4

Public Opinion

It is a recognized fact that every new maritime catastrophe is increasingly more
unacceptable both politically and economically, and the level of losses and damage
to the marine environment arouses greater and growing public anxiety (Boisson,
1996). Public opinion has the most dramatic influence on the decision-making
process and issues that are given the highest priority by governments. Consequently,
it is the regulatory regime that is usually most reactive to changes in the public’s
perception of maritime safety and environmental protection concerns. However,
recently there has been a greater awareness of marine environmental issues,
particularly in Europe, where several disasters have had catastrophic consequences.
This has led to a positive emerging trend where market players are becoming more
discriminating in choosing quality ships, in order to protect their reputation in the
market place. As long as the mezzanine regulatory regime assesses public opinion
accurately and takes a proactive approach in allaying any fears, and where necessary
only takes well calculated reactive measures, then the propeller will always be at the
most desired level of efficiency.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
Substandard shipping presents a clear and present danger to people, property, and the
fragile marine environment. Substandard ships have been operating from the earliest
time, when shipping was seen primarily as an adventure, the legacy of which still
haunts the industry even when there has been a distinct transformation, to a
structured business with well-defined rules and regulations. Eradicating this scourge
is the primary tasks of governments worldwide who have expressed their collective
will through the instruments produced at the IMO, a course of action necessary
because of the international nature of shipping.
The IMO has produced a profusion of international regulations that have been
tailored to promote quality shipping, which forms the basis for the regulatory regime
where flag and port states (major stakeholders) have very prominent roles. However,
there are several impediments to achieving this goal. The first impediment to the
process is the manner in which most of these regulations are established. They are
often “knee-jerk” reactions on the part of governments in the wake of a disaster,
caused by real or perceived public pressure. However, the FSA initiative by the IMO
should see an abatement of this occurrence.
The second impediment is the variation in quality and efficacy of flag state
implementation, which contributes to the problem of lack of proper accountability.
Many States do operate competent maritime administrations, but these are
undermined by the few States that confer nationality on vessels for the sole purpose
of the economic benefits to be derived, forsaking the inherent obligation of ensuring
strict compliance with international standards.

The existing flag state self-

assessment form and the proposed IMO voluntary model flag audit scheme, as well
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as the move by class societies to offer technical assistance to poorly performing flag
states, are all positive developments.
The next impediment relates to the prevailing attitude of secrecy and lack of proper
accountability in the industry. These problems are fostered by the variation in the
types of registries and interpretation of the concept of genuine link, which affords the
beneficial owners opportunity to hide behind corporate veils. This creates a very
serious deficiency in the regulatory process, as flag, port and coastal states are unable
to hold them accountable for culpable acts. This is compounded by the owners and
operators of substandard ships involved in accidents rarely being called to account
for their negligence by virtue of the protection afforded by their insurance cover.
This is the one impediment that lacks a direct solution.
Present international laws are very prescriptive, specific, and detailed, which to some
extent also creates additional impediments.

This is because they result in an

increasing cost in an industry that is averse to such repercussions, as the focus is on
cost reduction to ensure profit maximization; a product of the free market system.
These legislations can only be successful if supported and implemented by the
industry as a whole. Therefore it is the market players in the industry that offer the
greatest potential to accelerate the process of quality shipping, and the eventual
demise of substandard shipping.
The industry’s market players, classification societies, insurers, charters, and
financiers (minor stakeholders), whilst lacking direct responsibilities under the
regulatory regime, should exercise an ethical responsibility towards quality shipping
because their existence depends on ship-operations. It is understandable that they
operate in a very competitive environment, and are often pressured by substandard
operators to be lenient, but they should never compromise on principles and
standards that will result in a breach of the fundamental protective mechanism for
quality shipping. In fact, they should strive to compete on quality, not on price, as
the latter only provides a breeding ground for substandard shipping.
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Again this segment of the industry is afflicted with a divergence in performance
levels, where the majority of the players do take the initiative and fervently exercise
core principles in each sector (for example insurers and financiers through proper
risk assessments), to enhance quality shipping. It is the few that wantonly disregard
these principles in their quest to capture and maintain a market share that taints the
entire sector. Each of the sectors has a mechanism for self-regulation, which if
employed to the fullest can have a dramatic effect on the elimination of substandard
shipping.

However, its effectiveness is predicated on transparency and

accountability, within a safety-oriented culture. All that is lacking is the will and
commitment of all the players.
The efforts and effectiveness of PSC supports this “safety culture”, and the prospect
of a virtual global policing network, through inter-MOU cooperation, is very
encouraging. In addition, the ISM Code and STCW both lay the foundation for the
safety culture to permeate the entire industry. However, the ultimate success of the
quality shipping campaign rests with an appropriate regulatory regime, which can be
provided by a mezzanine regulatory regime: an amalgam of the regulatory regime
and the concept of self-regulation.
The discussions throughout this paper demonstrate that the goal of quality shipping
can be a reality, but it requires a holistic approach on the part of all stakeholders in
the industry. The proposed propeller principle therefore symbolises the way forward,
using the dynamics and characteristics of a ship’s propeller to illustrate that only
through effective and efficient cooperation and coordination can the ultimate demise
of substandard shipping be realised. However, it does not stop here, because quality
shipping is a process not a destination, therefore just like a ship requiring the
propeller to be turning to overcome inertia, so does the maritime industry require
vigilance and innovation to keep the industry free of substandard shipping. Having
the same universal interpretation of what constitutes a substandard ship still remains
a major challenge, since States’ surveyors are influenced by standards of education,
experience, culture, et al, a subject matter worthy of further examination.
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APPENDIX 1
Summary of the status of conventions as at 30th June 2003

Instrument

IMO Convention
1991 amendments
SOLAS 1974
SOLAS Protocol 1978
SOLAS Protocol 1988
Stockholm Agreement 1996
LL 1966
LL Protocol 1988
TONNAGE 1969
COLREG 1972
CSC 1972
1993 amendments
SFV Protocol 1993
STCW 1978
STCW-F 1995
SAR 1979
STP 1971
SPACE STP 1973
INMARSAT C 1976
INMARSAT OA 1976
1994 amendments
FAL 1965
MARPOL 73/78 (Annex I/II)
MARPOL 73/78 (Annex III)
MARPOL 73/78 (Annex IV)
MARPOL 73/78 (Annex V)

Entry into force date
17-Mar-58
25-May-80
01-May-81
03-Feb-00
01-Apr-97
21-Jul-68
03-Feb-00
18-Jul-82
15-Jul-77

Number of
Contracting
Parties
162
76
147
100

Percentage of
world tonnage*
98.44
82.49
98.40
94.73

63

63.18

8

9.61

151

98.38

64

63.12

136

98.14

142

97.39

06-Sep-77

72

60.13

-

6

3.89

-

9

8.94

28-Apr-84

144

98.38

-

4

3.30

22-Jun-85

77

51.49

02-Jan-74

17

22.42

02-Jun-77

16

21.51

16-Jul-79

88

92.29

16-Jul-79

86

91.32

-

39

29.79

05-Mar-67

94

60.95

02-Oct-83

125

96.92

01-Jul-92

108

84.36

27-Sep-03

92

52.47

31-Dec-88

113

90.57
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MARPOL Protocol 1997 (Annex VI)
LC 1972
1978 amendments
LC Protocol 1996
INTERVENTION 1969
INTERVENTION Protocol 1973
CLC 1969

-

11

53.84

30-Aug-75

80

70.44

-

20

19.03

-

17

06-May-75
30-Mar-83
19-Jun-75

CLC Protocol 1976
CLC Protocol 1992
FUND Protocol 1976
FUND Protocol 1992
FUND Protocol 2000
FUND Protocol 2003
NUCLEAR 1971
PAL 1974
PAL Protocol 1976
PAL Protocol 1990
PAL Protocol 2002
LLMC 1976
LLMC Protocol 1996
SUA 1988
SUA Protocol 1988
SALVAGE 1989
OPRC 1990
HNS Convention 1996
OPRC/HNS 2000
BUNKERS CONVENTION 2001
AFS CONVENTION 2001

78
44

10.67
71.28
45.06

43

4.82

55

57.88

92

91.54

33

46.97

30-May-96

85

87.18

27-Jun-01

-

-

-

-

-

15-Jul-75

16

19.78

28-Apr-87

29

35.52

30-Apr-89

23

35.24

-

3

0.77

-

-

-

01-Dec-86

40

44.21

-

8

9.90

01-Mar-92

90

76.52

01-Mar-92

82

76.21

14-Jul-96

43

34.27

13-May-95

72

58.84

-

3

1.87

-

6

11.31

-

2

0.42

-

3

2.2

08-Apr-81
30-May-96
22-Nov-94

Source: The International Maritime Organisation (IMO), (2003b).
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APPENDIX 2
IMPORTANT IMO CONVENTIONS

Convention

Number of Parties

% of world tonnage
covered

Load Lines 1966

140

98.19

SOLAS 1974

136

98.27

STCW 1978

130

97.55

Collision Regulations 1972

130

96.20

Tonnage 1969

118

97.51

MARPOL 73/78

102

93.48

Source: IMO (2003a), 50th Anniversary – a record of success.
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APPENDIX 3
UNCLOS ARTICLE 94

The following are some of the key duties outlined in Article 94, where a State shall:
1. Effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administration, technical
and social matters over ships flying its flag;
2. Maintain a register of ships containing the names and particulars of ships
flying its flag;
3. Assume jurisdiction under its internal law over each ship flying its flag and
its master, officers and crew in respect to administrative, technical and
social matters concerning the ship;
4. Take measures necessary to ensure safety at sea with regards to:
a. The construction, equipment and seaworthiness of ships;
b. The manning, labour conditions and the training of the crew; and
c. The use of signals, the maintenance of communications and the
prevention of collisions.
5. Ensure that each ship, before registration and thereafter at appropriate
intervals, is surveyed; and
6. Ensure that there is an enquiry or an investigation into any reports that may
reflect its own non-compliance, maritime casualties or incidents of
navigation on the high seas.
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APPENDIX 4
Profile and Characteristics of the Different Types of Ship Registries
Closed Registries: The closed registry is based on the traditional system of
conferring nationality only on ships owned by nationals of that State, commonly
referred to as Traditional Maritime State (TMS). However, there is a degree of
tightness reflective of how rigid the perception of genuine link is taken. This degree
of tightness varies from considering only natural born citizens as nationals to systems
where a national may include a domicile; a permanent resident or a subject who may
not be a citizen (Mukherjee, 1993). Additionally, in the case of corporate owners,
the entity must be a corporate body established under the laws of the flag state and
must have its principal place of business in the flag state. In essence the shipping
company is treated the same way as any other business in that state, even with
regards to incentives and subsidies (Stopford, 2000, p.434).
Open Registries: The open registry basically is somewhat the opposite of the closed
registry system. It permits the registration of ships in its jurisdiction without the
severe restriction imposed by the closed registry, reflecting a far more relaxed
perception of the concept of genuine link. Its establishment is specifically aimed at
offering ship owners a registration service, often as a means of earning an income.
Therefore the terms and condition may vary considerably depending on the policy of
the state concerned (Stopford, 2000, p.434).
Secondary Registries: The secondary registry or international registry, owes its
existence to the deliberate action on the part of TMS to counter the effects of the
open registry system that was causing mass migration from their flags. Located
offshore, they afford their ship owners the opportunity of flagging out, and operate
within a more favourable economic environment without sacrificing maritime safety.
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However, by flagging out, ships cease to be entitled to subsidies and other financial
incentives that might be afforded by the state (Mukherjee, 1993, p.34).
Hybrid Registries: The provisions of the 1986 United Nations Convention on the
Conditions for the Registration of Ships (UNCCROS)1, not yet in force, appear to
have been taken as the fundamental principles in the establishment of the hybrid
registry. For example, a corporate ship owner must be established and /or have its
principal place of business within the territory of the state of registry. Failing this,
there must be a representative or management person, natural or juridical, who or
which must be a national of the flag state and must be available to meet all legal,
financial and other obligations of the ship owner (Mukherjee, 1993, p.35). It is
important to note that these Hybrid registries have regulations pertaining to maritime
safety that mirrors the standards typical of closed registries.
Bareboat Charter Registries: The provisions of UNCCROS also provides some
procedural guidance for the registration of bareboat chartered-in vessels, which
basically involves two parties, the owner and the charterer; and two states, the state
of registration of the owner and the flag state of the charter. The involvement of two
registries in the context of bareboat charters has created a regime of dual or parallel
registration, which is accompanied by considerable advantages for everyone
involved: the owner earns charter revenue without having to operate the ship, the
charterer acquires a ship without having to purchase one and enjoys the benefits
offered in a flagging-in state, and the flagging-in state enjoys economic gains from
more tonnage added to its national fleet (Mukherjee, 1993, p.35).

1

UNCCROS attempted to articulate in definitive terms, the meaning of genuine link, and a number of
aspects relating to its requirements.
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APPENDIX 5
Coastal States Rights and Responsibilities in the UNCLOS
Established Maritime Zones

A Coastal State is any State that has a coastline and as such UNCLOS provides
certain provisions that entitles States to exercise varying rights and a hierarchy of
jurisdiction base on the established maritime zones. These zones are:
1. Internal waters: waters landwards of the baseline1, which consist of
ports, roads, bays and inland seas. Here the State sovereign powers to
promulgate and enforce laws governing maritime activities, including
terms and conditions governing access to its ports.
2. Territorial sea: waters extending 12 miles seaward of the baseline. Here
the State still exercise sovereignty but it is subjected to the right of
innocent passage2 of foreign ships. The same jurisdiction and condition
are also applicable in archipelagic water. States may however take action
against acts by ships that violate the principles of innocent passage, in
addition, UNCLOS Article 21, allows states to adopt laws and regulations
which may limit the right of innocent passage in order to regulate
maritime traffic, protect navigational aids etc.
3. Contiguous zone: waters having a breadth of 12 miles that are
immediately adjacent to and seaward of the territorial seas. Here States
are empowered to exercise the necessary control in respect to drug
smuggling, illegal immigration, customs and tax evasion, sanitary
offences, and pollution offences.

1

The baseline is the line form which the breadth of all the zones seawards (territorial seas, contiguous
zone and the exclusive economic zones) are measured.
2

Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to peace, good order or security of the coastal state
(UNCLOS 1982 Article 19).
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4. Exclusive economic zone (EEZ): under UNCLOS Article …States may
claim an EEZ of 200 mile from the baseline. Here the State has sovereign
right, which is the right to explore, exploit, develop, manage, and
conserve the resources found in the water, on the ocean floor, and in the
subsoil of this zone.
5. High Sea: that body of water that is not included in the aforementioned
maritime zones, which according to Article 89 UNCLOS, “No State may

validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty”.
However, coastal states may, according to Article 1 of the International
Convention Relating to the Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil
Pollution Casualties Act, 1987, take such measures on the high seas as
may be necessary to prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and imminent
danger to their coastline or related interests from pollution or threat of
pollution of the sea by oil, following upon a maritime casualty or acts
related to such a casualty.

91

APPENDIX 6
Relevant Instruments for Port State Control

1. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, its
Protocol of 1978, as amended, and the Protocol of 1988 (SOLAS 74/78/88,
regulation I/19, regulation IX/6 and regulation XI/4;
2. International Convention on Load Line 1966, as amended, and its 1988
Protocol (Load Line 66/88, article 21);
3. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as
modified by Protocol of 1978, as amended (MARPOL 73/78, article 5 and 6,
regulation 8A of Annex I, regulation 15 of Annex II, regulation 8 of Annex
III, and regulation 8 of Annex V);
4. International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch
keeping for Seafarers 1978, as amended (STCW 78, article X and regulation
I/4);
5. International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships 1969 (Tonnage
69, article 12);
6. Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea
1972, as amended (COLREG 72); and
7. Merchant

Shipping

(Minimum

Standards)

Convention,

1976

Convention No. 147).

Source: Paris MOU’s booket on Port State Control and Hoppe, 2002b.
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(ILO

APPENDIX 7
Global MOUs on Port State Control

Source: Mediterranean MOU

APPENDIX 8
JAMES REASON’S HYBRID MODEL

The figure above shows the basic elements of production in an organisation. These constitute the
necessary and benign components of any production system, on which the hybrid model below is
based, where the various human contributions to the breakdown of complex systems are mapped onto
the basic elements of production. It is assumed that the primary systemic origins of the latent failures
are the fallible decisions taken by top-level plant and corporate managers. These are then transmitted
via the intervening elements to the point where system defences may be breached.

Source: Reason, J. (1990). “Human Error”

94

APPENDIX 9
OPTIONS FOR FINANCING MERCHANT SHIPS

Adopted from:
Stopford, M. (2000). Maritime Economics (2nd ed.): Financing Ships and Shipping Companies.
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